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2006]
CREOLE AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-A TENTH ANNIVERSARY
EXAMINATION OF LOUISIANA'S CAPITAL
RAPE STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of imposing capital sentences on those convicted of desig-
nated crimes is as old as the history of society itself.1 Over time, as cultures
developed and advanced, many changes clearly materialized in the values
and customs of each individual society.2 In the United States, actions that
were considered criminal and punishable by death during the Colonial
and Revolutionary periods are today considered common activities and
not criminal at all.3 Conversely, punishments once considered legally and
socially acceptable now violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments. 4 As times change and American society
1. See, e.g., JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (1960) (re-
counting that "[f]rom the earliest times death as a deterrent to others must have
been common"). Evidence of capital punishment in ancient societies has been
found as early as 1500 B.C.E. in accounts of criminal trials in Egypt. See id. at 2
(outlining historical evidence of capital punishment). Additionally, the Bible is
replete with references to imposition of death for a multitude of crimes. See, e.g.,
Exodus 21:12 (authorizing capital punishment for murder); Exodus 21:16 (authoriz-
ing capital punishment for kidnapping); Exodus 22:19 (authorizing capital punish-
ment for bestiality); Exodus 35:2 (authorizing capital punishment for working on
Sabbath); Leviticus 20:10 (authorizing capital punishment for adultery); Leviticus
20:13 (authorizing capital punishment for homosexuality); Leviticus 24:16 (author-
izing capital punishment for blasphemy); Deuteronomy 22:20-21 (authorizing capital
punishment for loss of virginity).
2. See generally LAURENCE, supra note 1, at 1-27 (providing brief but compre-
hensive historical overview of changes in imposition of capital punishment in vari-
ous societies over course of 3500 years from ancient Egypt to modern United
States).
3. See BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606-1660 137
(1983) (reciting multitude of religious crimes in Colonial America, including fail-
ure to attend church services, violation of Sabbath, disturbing church services and
reviling church doctrine and ministers); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUN-
ISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 34 (1993) (noting that, in early years of our country,
"[a] n offense against God was an offense against society" and that acts of immoral
character were found to be criminal). Additionally, in a study of seven counties in
Massachusetts from 1760 to 1774, thirty-eight percent of all criminal cases were for
fornication, with almost all of those charges being brought against mothers of ille-
gitimate children. See id. at 54 (recounting statistics on capital punishment in early
America).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments);
see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 40 (including branding, letter-wearing, whip-
ping, banishment and mutilation as common punishments throughout seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries); Matthew W. Meskell, Note, The History of Prisons
in the United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. REv. 839, 84143 (1999) (outlining
early American punishments designed to inflict pain in effort to deter crime-
including whipping, branding and gagging-and punishments designed to humili-
(417)
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evolves, shifting customs mandate adjustments to the manner in which
criminals are punished.5 This requires constant vigilance and scrutiny by
the courts over government attempts to impose overly harsh
punishments.
6
Since 1972, when the Supreme Court of the United States in Furman
v. Georgia7 functionally invalidated all then-existing death penalty laws,
over three-quarters of the states and the federal government have reen-
acted statutes allowing for capital sentencing for certain crimes. 8 The
ate offenders-including use of stocks, pillories and scarlet letters); Barbara Clare
Morton, Note, Bringing Skeletons Out of the Closet and into the Light-"Scarlet Letter"
Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modem America Because It Deprives Offend-
ers of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 97, 101-04 (2001) (detailing shaming penalties
and their prevalence in Colonial America).
5. See MichaelJ. O'Connor, Note, What Would Darwin Say ?: The Mis-Evolution of
the Eighth Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1389, 1398 (2003) (observing Court
opinions that reflect necessity of changing punishments to adjust to changing soci-
etal conditions).
6. See generally Daniel Suleiman, Note, The Capital Punishment Exception: A Case
for Constitutionalizing the Substantive Criminal Law, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 426, 439-51
(2004) (outlining nature of judicial sentencing review in death penalty cases and
evaluating legitimacy of contention that "death is different" when appraising crimi-
nal sentences).
7. 408 U.S. 438 (1972).
8. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571,
585 (2005) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)) (noting that thirty-eight states presently authorize capital punishment). The
states that have specifically authorized capital punishment by statute are: Alabama
(ALA. CODE § 13A-540 (2005)); Arizona (Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (2005));
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 54-601 (2005)); California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 190
(West 2005)); Colorado (CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-401 (2005)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2005)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(2005)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (2005)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1
(2005)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4004 (2005)); Illinois (720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/9-1 (2005)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2005)); Kansas (KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3439 (2004)); Kentucky (Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (West 2005));
Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2004)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CRiM.
LAw § 2-201 (West 2002)); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (2004)); Mis-
souri (Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.020 (2005)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102
(2005)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-105 (2004)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.030 (2003)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (2005)); New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2005); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. § 30-2-1
(2003)); New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004)); North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2004); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929-02 (West
2005)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 21-701.9 (2005)); Oregon (OR. REv.
STAT. § 163.105 (2003); Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West
2005)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2004)); South Dakota (S.D.
CoDIFIED LAws § 22-6-1 (2005)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2005);
Texas (TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2005)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-202 (2005)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2005)); Washington
(WAsH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2005)); Wyoming (Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101
(2005)). The federal government has also reenacted capital sentencing statutes
providing for the death penalty for several crimes, all of which a life must be taken
to qualify a defendant for a capital sentence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2005)
(authorizing capital punishment for first-degree murder); id. § 1958 (authorizing
418 [Vol. 51: p. 417
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Court held that the standards juries employed in determining death
sentences were inadequate, resulting in applications of capital punishment
that were arbitrary and capricious.9 By and large, the statutes passed in
response to Furman addressed the inadequacies identified by the Court. 10
One requirement that has remained constant for a death sentence to be
validly imposed, however, is that a death must occur as a result of the
defendant's criminal acts."' Despite the Court's consistency and regular-
ity in sustaining this requirement, states have tried, over the years, to evade
this apparent prerequisite to execution.12 Presently, one state-Louisi-
ana-actively sanctions the imposition of a death sentence for a rape in
which no life was taken. 13 In the ten years since Louisiana passed its con-
capital punishment for murder for hire); id. § 2245 (authorizing capital punish-
ment for murder related to rape or child molestation). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's abrogation of capital punishment in the United States via
Furman, see infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
9. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 312-13 (White,J., concurring) (finding that manner
in which capital punishment was administered led to arbitrariness and capricious-
ness in dispensation of death sentences).
10. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-68 (1976) (Stewart, Powell
and Stevens, JJ., joint opinion) (describing revisions instituted by Georgia in re-
drafting its capital sentencing statute and reviewing in favorable manner in which
revisions would address concerns elucidated by Furman Court).
11. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Of God's Mercy and the
Four Biblical Methods of Capital Punishment: Stoning, Burning, Beheading, and Strangu-
lation, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1169, 1182 (2004) (observing that in contemporary
America, capital punishment has been reserved for murderers). But see Eugene
Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REv. 1957, 1968
(2004) ("It is possible that the death penalty may still be available for child rape
and for very serious national security crimes such as treason and espionage.").
12. For a discussion of states that have attempted to maintain legislation per-
mitting capital punishment for crimes involving sexual assaults, see infra note 13
and accompanying text.
13. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2004) (authorizing imposition of capital
sentence for aggravated rape where victim is under twelve years old). Although
Florida and Montana have also enacted aggravated rape laws, Florida's Supreme
Court declared its statute unconstitutional, and Montana has yet to impose its
death penalty on any offenders. See FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2) (a) (2005) (authoriz-
ing capital sentencing for adult offenders-those over eighteen years old-who
commit "sexual battery" on victims under twelve years of age), invalidated by Buford
v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(3)(c)(i) (2003)
(permitting imposition of death sentence for repeat sexual offenders, regardless of
victim's age). The Florida Supreme Court invalidated its capital child rape statute
in 1981, holding that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive
punishment for the crime of sexual assault and is therefore forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." Buford, 403 So. 2d at 951
(finding death sentence unconstitutional for crime where no life is taken). The
statute remains on the books today, despite its invalidation by the Florida Supreme
Court nearly twenty-five years ago. See § 794.011 (2) (a) (providing for capital pun-
ishment for rape of child under twelve despite invalidation by Florida Supreme
Court). Several additional states, including Alabama, California, Massachusetts,
Mississippi and Pennsylvania, have debated or considered similar statutes in their
legislatures but have yet to enact comparable legislation. See Corey Rayburn, Better
Dead Than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 1119, 1137 (2004) (reciting statutory changes that have been de-
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troversial statute, the landscape of American criminal justice has changed
dramatically. 14 Most importantly, the Supreme Court has clarified the cir-
cumstances under which a state may put one of its citizens to death, thus
raising a serious question of the constitutionality of Louisiana's capital
rape law.'
5
Accordingly, in recognition of the ten-year anniversary of Louisiana's
capital rape statute, it is appropriate to reexamine the statute in light of
recent developments in the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence. 16 Additionally, sufficient time has now passed to evaluate certain
statements made by the Louisiana Supreme Court in support of the stat-
ute. 17 The court stated that "[t]he fact that Louisiana is presently the sole
state allowing the death penalty for the rape of a child is not conclusive.
There is no constitutional infirmity in a state's statute simply because that
jurisdiction chose to be first."' 8 The past ten years have shown conclu-
sively that Louisiana was the first and remains the only state that actively
sanctions executing convicted child rapists. 19 Based on several develop-
ments in the interim decade impacting the constitutionality of capital rape
statutes, Louisiana's statute presently violates the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.2
0
bated and considered for adoption in various state legislatures). For a discussion
of Louisiana's capital child rape statute, see infra notes 117-40 and accompanying
text.
14. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 321, 338 (2002) (describing changing and emergent nature of crimi-
nal justice in America). See generally Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice,
40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 359 (2005) (outlining historical changes in criminal
justice and calculating potential future implications of continued change).
15. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005) (declaring capital
sentences unconstitutional when imposed on offenders who were under eighteen
at time capital crime was committed); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)
(holding that execution of mentally retarded criminals violates Eighth Amend-
ment). For a discussion of Roper, see infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Atkins, see infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the passage and implementation of Louisiana's capital
rape statute, see infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
recent Supreme Court cases having an impact on capital punishment, see infra
notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
17. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996) (suggesting that stat-
ute's legitimacy is not impeached by failure of other states to enact similar legisla-
tion and predicting that other states would follow Louisiana's lead once statute's
constitutionality was settled judicially), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1068 (noting that Louisiana was only state permitting execution
of convicted child rapists); see also Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1137-39 (reciting
states that have debated legislation similar to Louisiana's and commenting that no
other states have acted on these debates and enacted comparable legislation).
20. SeeJ. Chandler Bailey, Note, Death Is Different, Even on the Bayou: The Dispro-
portionality of Crime and Punishment in Louisiana's Capital Child Rape Statute, 55 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1335, 1371 (1998) (arguing against capital rape statutes); Jennifer L.
Cordle, Note, State v. Wilson: Social Discontent, Retribution, and the Constitutionality of
Capital Punishment for Raping a Child, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 135, 162 (1998) (opposing
[Vol. 51: p. 417
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The Constitution protects individuals' rights and freedoms against
unreasonable government action. 2 1 Specifically, the Eighth Amendment
guards Americans from imposition of punishments that society regards as
unacceptable. 2 2 As the Supreme Court has developed its methodology in
examining the constitutionality of punishments, it has invalidated penal
sentences that are arbitrary and capricious, as well as those that are dispro-
portionate or otherwise offend the Constitution by failing to achieve ei-
ther of the primary aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence.
23
capital child rape statutes); Annaliese Flynn Fleming, Comment, Louisiana's Newest
Capital Crime: The Death Penalty for Child Rape, 89 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
749 (1999) (deducing that contemporary society rejects death sentences for child
rapists); PamelaJ. Lormand, Comment, Proportionate Sentencing for the Rape of a Mi-
nor: The Death Penalty Dilemma, 73 TUL. L. REV. 981, 1015 (1999) ("The Louisiana
rape of a minor statute at issue in State v. Wilson does not meet the tests employed
by the United States Supreme Court in determining the constitutionality of the
death penalty for a given offense."); Emily Marie Moeller, Comment, Devolving
Standards of Decency: Using the Death Penalty to Punish Child Rapists, 102 DICK. L. REv.
621, 648 (1998) (concluding that death penalty should be reserved for offenders
who take human life); David W. Schaaf, Note, What if the Victim Is a Child? Examin-
ing the Constitutionality of Louisiana's Challenge to Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REv. 347, 378 (advising against imposing death penalty for child rape); Lisa White
Shirley, Note, State v. Wilson: The Louisiana Supreme Court Sanctions the Death Penalty
for Child Rape, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1913, 1923-24 (1998) (concluding that Louisiana's
capital child rape statute is unconstitutional). But seeJ. Richard Broughton, "On
Horror's Head Horrors Accumulate": A Reflective Comment on Capital Child Rape Legisla-
tion, 39 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 42 (2000) (concluding that capital rape statutes do not
violate Constitution); Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisi-
ana's Amended Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 Am.J. CRIM. L. 79, 112-13 (1997) (arguing
in support of capital child rape statutes if sufficient safeguards are implemented to
limit class of death-eligible defendants); Elizabeth Gray, Comment, Death Penalty
and Child Rape: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 42 ST. Louis L.J. 1443, 1469 (1998)
(supporting capital child rape statutes); Melissa Meister, Note, Murdering Innocence:
The Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape Statutes, 45 ARtz. L. REv. 197, 224 (2003)
(asserting constitutionality of capital sentencing for child rapists); Bridgette M.
Palmer, Note, Death as a Proportionate Penalty for the Rape of a Child: Considering One
State's Current Law, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 843, 877-78 (1999) (predicting that Su-
preme Court will uphold Louisiana's capital rape statute and that other states will
also implement similar legislation); Matthew Silversten, Comment, Sentencing
Coker v. Georgia to Death: Capital Child Rape Statutes Provide the Supreme Court an
Opportunity to Return Meaning to the Eighth Amendment, 37 GONZ. L. REv. 121, 166
(2001-02) (arguing broadly that not only are capital rape statutes constitutional
but that Supreme Court should overrule Coker). For a discussion of the ability of
the arguments in Wilson to withstand a challenge before the Supreme Court, see
infra notes 159-218 and accompanying text.
21. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANG-
INC AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 7-10 (2001) (describing
principles underlying Constitution and portraying importance of separation of
powers and checks and balances to maintenance of individual rights).
22. See Mark Spatz, Comment, Shame's Revival: An Unconstitutional Regression, 4
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 827, 842 (2002) ("The Supreme Court has transformed the
Eighth Amendment into secular gospel espousing humanity to all. . . . [T]he
Eighth Amendment was put in place to protect human dignity.").
23. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (prohibiting capi-
tal punishment on juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)
(prohibiting capital punishment on mentally retarded offenders); Enmund v. Flor-
5
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Accordingly, the Court should invalidate Louisiana's capital rape statute
because it fails to comport with the Court's requirements for valid
punishments.
24
This Note does not analyze or consider the morality underlying the
application of the death penalty but rather confines itself to addressing
the constitutionality of capital rape statutes under the Supreme Court's
current jurisprudence. 25 First, Part II of this Note examines the historical
progression of the death penalty in the United States.2 6 Next, Part III
catalogues the resurrection of statutes, appearing first in Louisiana in
1995, which permit capital sentences for sexual assaults committed with
particular aggravation. 27 Part IV reports recent Supreme Court rulings
with potential impacts on the validity of capital rape statutes.2 8 Part V
examines the effect these cases will have on the Court's analytical ap-
proach to potential challenges to capital sexual assault statutes.29 Finally,
Part VI concludes that Louisiana's capital rape statute is unconstitutional
ida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (invalidating capital sentence for accomplice of-
fender who did not kill, intend to kill or attempt to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding that Constitution does not permit death sentence
for crime of rape); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 88, 103 (1958) (concluding that Eighth
Amendment prohibits denationalization as punishment); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (finding fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor, shack-
led at wrist and ankle, disproportionate to crime of forgery and prohibited by
Eighth Amendment).
24. For a discussion of the proper analysis with which to examine the constitu-
tionality of capital rape statutes, see infra notes 174-218 and accompanying text.
25. See generally MARK CosTANzo, JUST REVENGE: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE DEATH PENALTY 129-49 (1997) (examining moral justifications in favor of capi-
tal punishment); Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics
of Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996) (summarizing
moral and ethical dilemmas inherent in application of capital punishment);
Davison M. Douglas, God and the Executioner: The Influence of Western Religion on the
Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 137 (2000) (providing historical overview
of religious attitudes towards capital punishment and influences those attitudes
have had on states' utilization of death penalty); Richard W. Garnett, Christian Wit-
ness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 541 (2003) (outlining moral and religious objections to capital punish-
ment); Ori Lev, Personal Morality and Judicial Decision-Making in the Death Penalty
Context, 11 J.L. & RELICION 637 (1994-95) (critiquing moral considerations in capi-
tal jurisprudence in rulings and decisions of particular judges and justices);
Thomas J. Walsh, On the Abolition of Man: A Discussion of the Moral and Legal Issues
Surrounding the Death Penalty, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (1996) (discussing certain
moral and legal objections to capital punishment).
26. For a discussion of the origins and subsequent history of capital punish-
ment in the United States, see infra notes 31-110 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the justifications and circumstances surrounding the
rebirth of capital rape statutes, see infra notes 111-40 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of recent Supreme Court decisions with an impact on
capital rape jurisprudence, see infra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the potential ramifications of recent Court decisions
on capital rape jurisprudence, see infra notes 159-218 and accompanying text.
422 [Vol. 51: p. 417
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punishments.
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II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT EVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Development and Application of Capital Punishment in the United States
Before Furman
Capital punishment was utilized in the United States from the time
the first settlers arrived on the continent. 31 The pilgrims brought from
Europe their religious and moral convictions, coupled with a stringent
stance on law and order in the Colonies, where many crimes were punisha-
ble by death. 32 Over time, support for capital punishment in America
waxed and waned, and the number of annual executions in the United
States declined at a steady rate beginning in 1935, when 199 executions
occurred, until 1967, when the last execution was carried out in the
United States before Furman.
3 3
American judicial history of capital punishment jurisprudence began
in 1879 with Wilkerson v. Utah.34 In Wilkerson, the Supreme Court held that
execution by firing squad did not violate the Eighth Amendment's pro-
scription on cruel and unusual punishments.3 5 Previous cases heard by
30. For a summary discussion of the arguments presented in this Note and
the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of child rap-
ists, see infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
31. See Nicholas Levi, Note, Veil of Secrecy: Public Executions, Limitations on Re-
porting Capital Punishment, and the Content-Based Nature of Private Execution Laws, 55
FED. COMM. L.J. 131, 133-35 (2002) (noting prevalence of capital punishment be-
ginning in Colonial era); Kristi Tumminello Prinzo, Note, The United States-"Capi-
tal" of the World: An Analysis of Why the United States Practices Capital Punishment While
the International Trend Is Towards Its Abolition, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 855, 868-69
(1999) (examining origins of capital punishment in America).
32. Accord Levi, supra note 31, at 133 ("The Colonial punishment scheme was
modeled heavily after the system in England .... "); see CHAPIN, supra note 3, at 55
(noting transference of Puritan ethic and use of death penalty from England to
American colonies); THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 5 (Hugo
Adam Bedau ed., 1964) (discussing variations of capital punishment between indi-
vidual American colonies).
33. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 208
(2002) (outlining steady decrease in number of executions in United States during
first half of twentieth century). 1968 marked the first year since the establishment
of the United States that no executions were transacted within its borders. See id.;
see also M. WATT Espy & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1608-2002: THE ESPY FILE, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ESPYdate.pdf (last
visited Oct. 12, 2005) (identifying every execution carried out in United States
from 1608-2002, including demographic information about deceased, jurisdiction
which authorized execution, crime(s) committed by deceased and method of
execution).
34. 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
35. See id. at 134-35 (describing historical basis for capital punishment and
death by firing squad and concluding that execution by firing squad was constitu-
tionally permissible). Wilkerson had been convicted by ajury of murder and sen-
tenced to death by firing squad. See id. at 130-31 (reciting facts). In appealing his
2006] NOTE
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the Court had not raised objections under the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause. 36 Thus Wilkerson represented the Court's first foray into the
viability of the Eighth Amendment as a means to challenge capital punish-
ment statutes.
37
Eleven years after Wilkerson, the Court was again confronted with a
challenge to a specific method of execution in In re Kemmler.38 Kemmier
challenged a New York statute, which provided for execution by electrocu-
tion for first-degree murder.39 In a ruling markedly similar to that handed
down in Wilkerson, the Court declined to hold electrocution to be a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment, noting that "the punishment of death is
not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the
[C]onstitution."40 Despite a bevy of recent public outcry against the con-
tinued use of the electric chair, Kemmler remains valid law today.4 1
sentence, he did not argue that the imposition of a capital sentence was cruel and
unusual, per se, but that the method the State of Utah sought to use, the firing
squad, violated the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 131 (same). In rendering its
verdict, the Court analyzed multiple treatises on military law and reached the con-
clusion that "the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty
for the crime of murder in the first degree is not included [as a cruel and unusual
punishment] within the meaning of the eighth amendment." Id. at 135.
36. See id. (summarizing previous challenges and finding no inconsistency in
upholding death sentence).
37. See generally Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less Than the Dignity of Man:
Evolving Standards, Botched Executions and Utah's Controversial Use of the Firing Squad,
50 CLEV. ST. L. Rv. 335, 368-69 (2002) (discussing early importance of Wilkerson
and In reKemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), on Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence).
For a discussion of Kemmler, see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
38. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
39. See id. at 441 (reciting facts). Kemmler was convicted of first-degree mur-
der and sentenced to die in New York's electric chair. See id. at 43941 (same). He
appealed his sentence on the grounds that electrocution violated the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See id. at 441 (same).
40. Id. at 447. The Court determined that although the Eighth Amendment
did not apply to the states, Kemmler's challenge would still have failed because a
sentence of death was not cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. See id. (reciting holding). The Court further opined that "if the
punishment prescribed for an offence against the laws of the State were manifestly
cruel and unusual as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or
the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within
the constitutional prohibition." Id. at 446. In recent years, state snpreme courts
have divided as to whether or not modern jurisprudence prohibits the continued
use of electrocution as a constitutional form of execution. Compare Dawson v.
State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 145 (Ga. 2001) (determining that continued use of electro-
cution, in light of availability of more humane alternatives such as lethal injection,
violates Georgia's constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments),
with Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76, 80 (Fla. 1997) (upholding continued use of
electrocution as permissible method of execution under Florida's constitution),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1014 (1998).
41. See Reid v. Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 543, 545 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting
that electrocution remains constitutionally acceptable method of execution). See
generally Dawn Macready, The "Shocking" Truth About the Electric Chair: An Analysis of
the Unconstitutionality of Electrocution, 26 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 781, 793-99 (2000) (cata-
424 [Vol. 51: p. 417
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During the first sixty years of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court decided two cases that, although not involving capital sentencing,
are essential to later debates on the definition of "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments."4 2 In Weems v. United States,43 the defendant was sentenced to
fifteen years imprisonment at hard and painful labor for falsifying public
records.44 The Court struck down the punishment as cruel and unusual
because the defendant's crime and sentence were disproportionate. 45
While the Court could not elucidate what specifically constituted dispro-
portionality in sentencing, it commented that a central consideration to
such review was an evaluation of the sentence's severity compared with
sentences both for comparable and more severe crimes. 46 The Court con-
cluded that severe sentences for relatively minor crimes were dispropor-
loguing recent mishaps during electrocutions and responses of courts to argu-
ments that these botched executions constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
42. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits punishment of denationalization); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (holding that excessive punishments are also cruel and unu-
sual). For a discussion of Weems, see infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of Trop, see infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
43. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
44. See id. at 360 (reciting facts). Weems was a United States citizen living in
the Philippines, then under American control. See id. (same). He was convicted of
falsifying public and official documents upon evidence that he had forged pay
records to indicate that some employees had received salary payments when they
had not and that he subsequently kept the money for himself. See id. at 362-63
(same).
45. See id. at 357-58 (finding punishment disproportionate to crime and in
violation of Eighth Amendment); id. at 381 (discussing proportionality in sentenc-
ing). The Court described the punishment, known as cadena temporal, graphically,
in an effort to illustrate its severity:
Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve years
and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and
painful labor, no assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority
or parental rights or rights of property, no participation even in the fam-
ily council. These parts of his penalty endure for the term of imprison-
ment. From other parts there is no intermission. His prison bars and
chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to
a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow
of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of the criminal magis-
trate, not being able to change his domicil without giving notice to the
"authority immediately in charge of his surveillance," and without permis-
sion in writing.
Id. at 366. Furthermore, the Court found that an individual convicted in the Phil-
ippines of falsification of bank notes, which could result in the loss of thousands of
dollars, could be sentenced to no greater punishment than an individual who com-
mitted a crime similar to Weems's. See id. at 380-81 (seeking proportionality in
sentencing). Finding this punishment to be "repugnant to the bill of rights [sic],"
the Court reversed judgment against Weems and declared the punishment a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 382 (reversing judgment of lower court).
46. See id. at 380 (identifying multitude of crimes, including certain degrees
of homicide and crimes analogous to treason, that are not punished as severely as
defendant had been).
9
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tionate and constituted violations of the Eighth Amendment. 47 Weerns
marked the first time the Court rejected a penalty as cruel and unusual,
and it also established the requirement of proportionality in the imposi-
tion of punishment.
48
In 1958, the Court was again confronted with an opportunity to fur-
ther define cruel and unusual punishments in Trop v. Dulles.4 9 The defen-
dant was charged with and convicted of desertion from the army while
stationed in Morocco during World War 11.50 He later discovered that he
had lost his citizenship as a result of his wartime desertion.5 1 The Su-
preme Court, hearing the appeal from the dissolution of his citizenship,
held that the "use of denationalization as a punishment [was] barred by
the Eighth Amendment" because such punishment is disproportionate to
the crime of desertion. 52 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the plurality,
stated that "the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and
their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."5 3
This statement achieved prominence among courts in evaluating the con-
stitutionality of punishments, and all questions of proportionality now
hinge on how the punishment is seen in light of "evolving standards of
47. See id. (rejecting disproportionate sentences as unconstitutional).
48. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv.
1049, 1052 (2004) (explaining principles of proportionality in sentencing and ef-
fect on American jurisprudence); see also MICHAEL A. FOLEY, ARBITRARY AND CAPRI-
cious: THE SUPREME COURT, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 26
(2003) (critiquing approaches taken by Justices McKenna and White in their re-
spective majority and dissenting opinions in Weems and describing framework in
which complete examination of impact of Weems must occur); Cutler, supra note
37, at 373-75 (delineating importance of Weems decision on future constitutional
interpretation and extrapolating that "the Weems Court allowed the judiciary to
consider modern interpretations of cruelty and unusualness").
49. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
50. See id. at 87-88 (reciting facts). Trop had been a private in the army and
escaped from a stockade in Casablanca, where he had been confined following an
earlier disciplinary violation. See id. at 87 (same). He was located the following day
and voluntarily returned to the control of the military, at which time he surren-
dered to the military police. See id. (same). The total duration of his absence was
less than a day. See id. (same).
51. See id. at 88 (stating facts). Section 401 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940
provided that as a consequence of his conviction as a deserter, Trop had been
stripped of his citizenship and his nationality as an American. See id. (noting con-
sequences of desertion as applied through Act).
52. See id. at 101 (reciting holding and declaring punishment of citizenship
forfeiture contrary to Constitution).
53. Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added). The Chief Justice continued:
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture.
There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organ-
ized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it
destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the
development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the na-
tional and international political community.
426 [Vol. 51: p. 417
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decency."54 Trop marked only the third instance in which the Court invali-
dated a criminal penalty under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments.
55
B. Furman v. Georgia-The Supreme Court Invalidates America's Capital
Punishment Statutes
In 1972, the Court effectively invalidated all then-existing statutes per-
mitting capital sentencing in the landmark case Furman v. Georgia.
56
Furman represented a challenge to Georgia's method of imposing capital
sentences. 57 The defendants in Furman were sentenced to death in judi-
cial proceedings that allowed judges and juries untrammeled discretion in
imposing sentences-no guidelines existed to assist the judges or juries in
determining appropriate sentences. 58 Furman has proven to be the cor-
54. See BANNER, supra note 33, at 249 (recounting that after Justice Goldberg
was installed on Supreme Court, he circulated memorandum to other Justices
questioning validity of capital punishment under Eighth Amendment, heavily em-
phasizing "evolving standards of decency"); FOLEY, supra note 48, at 42 ("Ulti-
mately, the 'evolving standards of decency' concept may be the benchmark against
which all punishments are compared and evaluated."); Matthew Debbis, The Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment Prohibits the Execution of Men-
tally Retarded Defendants: Atkins v. Virginia, 41 DuQ. L. Rrv. 811, 826 (2003) ("The
Eighth Amendment implications that resulted from [ Trop] served as the backbone
for determining whether a punishment was in violation of the cruel and unusual
[punishments] clause of the Eighth Amendment."). Additionally, one commenta-
tor expounds that:
Warren's phrase, "evolving standards of decency," accurately describes
both what examination of the framers' intention reveals and how the Su-
preme Court consistently dealt with the Eighth Amendment. Intention
and precedent thus point in the same direction: The Eighth Amendment
authorizes the Ulustices of the Supreme Court to use their bestjudgment
to decide whether a particular punishment is so inconsistent with con-
temporary standards of justice and with widely accepted theories of pun-
ishment as to be "cruel and unusual."
MARK TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: THE DEATH PENALTY 16 (1994).
55. See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THEJUDI-
CIAL PROCESS 129 (2d ed. 2001) (noting Court at that time "had invalidated only
three punishments under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause"). The
Court invalidated punishments in Weems, then Trop and finally in Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra (same).
56. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman was decided concurrently with two compan-
ion cases, Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. See id. at 239 (per curiam) (noting
consolidation of cases).
57. See id. (recounting nature of appeal brought in Furman). Furman was
charged with and convicted of murder for shooting a man whose house he was
burglarizing. See id. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring) (reciting facts).
58. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing wide discretion af-
forded judges and juries in capital sentencing procedures). Defendants chal-
lenged their convictions based on this overly wide latitude. See id. (articulating
nature of defendants' appeals); see also Michael A. Cokley, Comment, Whatever
Happened to That Old Saying "Thou Shalt Not Kill?": A Plea for the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, 2 Lov. J. PUB. INT. L. 67, 89-90 (2001) (remarking that Court's rea-
soning in Furman was that Georgia's death penalty law was arbitrary in nature and
gave too much discretion to juries in passing sentences).
11
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nerstone decision in the Court's history of adjudicating imposition of the
death penalty-a period now exceeding 135 years.
59
Invalidating the Georgia (and Texas) sentencing procedures as incon-
sistent with the Eighth Amendment, the Furman Court produced ten sepa-
rate opinions spanning over 230 pages, a most extraordinary
occurrence. 60 Specifically, the Court held that the death sentences in
Furman were cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
61
Georgia's capital sentencing statute had allowed the sentencer (either
judge orjury) to determine a sentence of life or death based on any infor-
mation the sentencer considered relevant, and the Court found that this
discretion led to arbitrary and capricious sentencing, resulting in a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment.6 2 The dissenters explained individually
59. See BANNER, supra note 33, at 261 (characterizing Furman as "one of the
most significant decisions in the history of the Court"); FOLEY, supra note 48, at 62
("[Furman] remains the most important Supreme Court decision on the death
penalty ... [and is] a decision we must understand if we are to understand any-
thing about the constitutional issues that confront the Court yearly.").
60. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam) (reciting opinion of Court
containing specific holding and identifying five Justices filing separate concurring
opinions and four Justices filing separate dissenting opinions); see also BANNER,
supra note 33, at 261 (describing all nine Justices writing individual opinions in
Furman as "an unusual step" but necessary in light of significant nature of deci-
sion); FOLEY, supra note 48, at 62 (including length and depth of Furman opinion
as reason for its continuing relevance and importance in examinations of capital
punishment). For a discussion of the individual concurrences and dissents, see
infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
61. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam) (summarizing holding). The
per curiam opinion stated that "the imposition and carrying out of the death pen-
alty in these cases constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments" and ordered the judgments reversed as to
the matter of sentence. Id.
62. See id. at 255-57 (Douglas,J, concurring) (" [T] he discretion ofjudges and
juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied
.... Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation.");
id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are cruel and unu-
sual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."); id. at
313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he penalty is so infrequently imposed that the
threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal jus-
tice."). Two Justices joined the plurality, writing that the imposition of death as a
punishment always violated the Clause and was unconstitutional per se. See id. at
286 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is a denial of human dignity for the State arbi-
trarily to subject a person to an unusually severe punishment that society has indi-
cated it does not regard as acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal
purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic punishment."); id. at 360
(Marshall, J., concurring) (" [E]ven if capital punishment is not excessive, it none-
theless violates the Eighth Amendment because it is morally unacceptable to the
people of the United States at this time in their history."). Justice Marshall further
stated that "the question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial
proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punish-
ment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all
information presently available." Id. at 362. This passage, in which Marshall states
his belief that an enlightened society would oppose capital punishment, became
known as the "Marshall Hypothesis," a foundation of Marshall's capital jurispru-
12
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that, regardless of their personal opinions on the death penalty, the ap-
propriate forum for debates on such punishments was in state legislatures,
not in federal courts.63 The practical effect of Furman was to create a mor-
atorium on executions and commute the sentences of all inmates then on
death row.64 Furman drove the capital statutes in the United States into
disarray and sent state legislatures into a drafting frenzy, as they composed
new legislation in attempts to rewrite their death penalty statutes in a man-
ner acceptable to the Court.65
C. Contemporary Era of Death Penalty Jurisprudence-Capital Punishment
After Furman
1. Initial Post-Furman Cases
Almost immediately after Furman, individual states began revising and
reenacting their capital statutes in efforts to bring their death penalty laws
within the standards outlined in Furman.66 The first case challenging
dence. See HuGo ADAM BEDAU, KILLING AS PUNISHMENT 99-101 (2004) (explaining
"Marshall Hypothesis" and discussing later empirical attempts to verify proposition
that informed populous would oppose capital punishment); see also Austin Sarat &
Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the
Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 171, 177-97 (discussing viability of "Marshall
Hypothesis" and describing results of efforts to test theory). See generally Alan W.
Clarke et al., Executing the Innocent: The Next Step in the Marshall Hypotheses, 26 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 309 (2000-01) (examining critically Marshall's hypotheses
of public opinion and impacts on support for capital punishment and discussing
recent public opinion polls on capital punishment).
63. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("There are no obvi-
ous indications that capital punishment offends the conscience of society to such a
degree that our traditional deference to the legislative judgment must be aban-
doned."); id. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expressing belief that proper fo-
rum for debates over utility and proportionality of capital punishment is in
Congress and state legislatures, not in courts); id. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("[T]he decision [ruling the death penalty unconstitutional] encroaches upon an
area squarely within the historic prerogative of the legislative branch-both state
and federal-to protect the citizenry through the designation of penalties for
prohibitable conduct."); id. at 467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The most expan-
sive reading of the leading constitutional cases does not remotely suggest that this
Court has been granted a roving commission. . . to strike down laws that are based
upon notions of policy or morality suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of
this Court.").
64. See David R. Schieferstein, The Death Penalty Cases: Shaping Substantive Crim-
inal Law, 58 IND. L.J. 187, 192 (1982-83) (arguing that while scope of Furman deci-
sion was not necessarily clear, its effect was to invalidate majority of capital
sentencing schemes then in effect); Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the
New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1690, 1690 (1974) (noting that Furman
"mandated the invalidation of statutes enacted by thirty-nine states and by the fed-
eral government, and the reversal of [over 600] death sentences").
65. See BANNER, supra note 33, at 267-70 (describing steps taken by various
state legislatures to bring their capital punishment statutes in accord with require-
ments described by Furman Court).
66. See id. at 268 (recognizing that following announcement of Furman deci-
sion, "legislators in five states professed their intention to introduce bills to resur-
rect capital punishment"). Within four years of Furman, thirty-five states and the
2006] NOTE
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these new statutes was Gregg v. Georgia 7 in 1976. In Gregg, the defendant
was charged with armed robbery and murder and was convicted at trial. 68
Following his conviction, in a separate sentencing stage, the jury sen-
tenced the defendant to die for his crimes. 69 The Supreme Court ruled
that the safeguards implemented by the Georgia Legislature into the trial
process-including the bifurcated (two-stage) trial and the jury's ability to
consider mitigating and aggravating circumstances in advance of passing
sentence-were sufficient to protect the rights of criminal defendants.
70
federal government had enacted new statutes permitting capital punishment for
certain offenders. See id. (detailing post-Furman legislative enactments); see also
Huco ADAM BEDAU, DEATH Is DIFFERENT 164 (1987) (noting that thirty-six states
had active capital punishment statutes in 1987). That number had increased to
thirty-eight states by 2002. See Gershowitz, supra note 8, at 585 (citing Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (identifying states that
sanction capital punishment).
67. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
68. See id. at 158-60 (Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ., joint opinion) (stating
facts).
69. See id. at 161 (same). The new statute enacted by Georgia in response to
Furman provided for a two-stage, or bifurcated, trial: a guilt stage, in which the
defendant's guilt or innocence was determined, and a sentencing stage, in which
the appropriate punishment was determined and imposed. See id. at 162-68. Addi-
tionally, during the sentencing stage, the jury was permitted to consider any facts
presented in mitigation or aggravation, which might lead it toward or away from
leniency in sentencing. See id. at 163-66. The Court found that the ability to con-
sider mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances in sentencing was an adequate
safeguard against much of the previously untrammeled discretion afforded to ju-
ries in capital sentencing. See id. at 197. The jury's attention was directed away
from characteristics of the defendant and focused, more appropriately, on the cir-
cumstances of the defendant's crime. See id. (praising statute's centering of atten-
tion on specifics of criminal act rather than on criminal defendant). This, the
Court found, was an important measure to ensure that sentences imposed on de-
fendants were more properly based on the crimes committed and less on personal,
racial or economic attributes of an individual defendant. See id. (same). Specifi-
cally, the Court noted that "while some jury discretion still exists, the discretion to
be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce non-
discriminatory application" of the death penalty. Id. at 197-98 (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). In addition to the safeguards implemented in the
trial process, the statutory sentencing scheme provided for an automatic appeal of
all death sentences to the Georgia Supreme Court. See id. at 198 (discussing and
approving automatic review of capital sentences by state supreme court). The
Georgia Supreme Court was then required to "review each sentence of death and
determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice,
whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circum-
stance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those sentences
imposed in similar cases." Id. (citation omitted). This automatic appeal, the Court
determined, was an "important... safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice."
Id.
70. See id. at 191-92 ("[A] bifurcated system is more likely to ensure elimina-
tion of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman."). The Court also con-
cluded that juries' lack of experience and expertise in imposing sentences on
defendants would be offset and alleviated by their ability to consider mitigating
and aggravating circumstances. See id. at 192 (expressing favor for additional safe-
guard of aggravating and mitigating circumstances).
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The Court concluded that the wholesale sweeping changes Georgia had
implemented in its capital sentencing scheme were sufficient to overcome
the arbitrariness and capriciousness inherent in the system, as identified in
Furman.7 ' Accordingly, the Court declared the revised Georgia capital
punishment scheme sufficient to prevent the imposition of a death sen-
tence from violating the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause.
72
The following year, the Court addressed the question of whether the
death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape in
Coker v. Georgia.73 In Coker, the defendant was charged with and convicted
of, inter alia, armed robbery, kidnapping and rape.7 4 At trial, he was con-
victed and sentenced to death. 75 Examining the viability of capital sen-
tencing for rape, the Court noted a specific trend among the states against
imposing such sentences. 76 The Supreme Court ruled that "a sentence of
71. See id. at 191-95 (holding that procedures implemented by Georgia Legis-
lature were sufficient to give sentencers enough guidance in decision-making that
arbitrariness and capriciousness had been sufficiently eliminated from sentencing
procedures).
72. See id. at 207 (sustaining constitutionality of Georgia's revised capital sen-
tencing scheme). The Court opined that "It]he new Georgia sentencing proce-
dures ... focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and
the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant," and that "[n]o
longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence." Id. at 206-
07. The Court confined its holding in Gregg, however, to sustain capital sentencing
for crimes in which a life was taken. See id. at 187 n.35 (explaining that facts of
Gregg only warrant judicial determination of constitutionality of death sentence for
crimes resulting in death). Specifically, the Court explained: "We do not address
here the question whether the taking of the criminal's life is a proportionate sanc-
tion where no victim has been deprived of life-for example, when capital punish-
ment is imposed for rape, kidnapping, or armed robbery that does not result in
the death of any human being." Id. For a discussion of the constitutionality of
death sentences for rape, see infra notes 73-78 and 111-40 and accompanying text.
73. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
74. See id. at 587 (reciting facts). At the time of the commission of his of-
fenses in this case, Coker had been incarcerated for multiple crimes, including
rape and murder, but subsequently escaped from prison, accosted a couple in
their Georgia home, robbed them and raped the woman. See id. (same).
75. See id. at 591 (explaining jury's decision to impose death sentence). The
jury found the presence of aggravating factors and found that these were not out-
weighed by any mitigation. See id. (same).
76. See id. at 593-96 (examining history of capital punishment application for
rape). The Court noted that in the preceding fifty years, there had never been a
majority of states that authorized death as a punishment for rape. See id. at 593
(same). Additionally, following Furman's invalidation of all then-existent capital
sentencing statutes, only six states passed revised statutes that permitted death
sentences for rape, compared to sixteen states whose capital rape statutes were
invalidated by Furman. See id. at 594-95 (finding paucity in number of states that
reimplemented capital rape statutes after Furman). The Court identified Georgia,
North Carolina and Louisiana as the only states that provided for capital sentences
for the rape of an adult woman and noted that because both of the latter states
made the death penalty mandatory upon conviction, those statutes were invali-
dated by other Court decisions the previous year. See id. at 594 (recounting spe-
cific states that reinstituted such laws). Florida, Mississippi and Tennessee had
20061 NOTE
15
Levine: Creole and Unusual Punishment - A Tenth Anniversary Examination o
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime
of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual punishment. '77 At the time, Cokers holding was essential to the
Court's uncertain capital sentencing jurisprudence-an apparent prece-
dent prohibiting capital punishment for non-homicide crimes.78 Eigh-
teen years later, however, Coker gave rise to a new and hotly contested
controversy regarding the constitutionality of capital rape statutes-those
that sanction death sentences where the rape victim is a child. 79
2. Capital Punishment and the Felony Murder Rule
Since the acceptance of revised capital punishment statutes in Gregg,
the Court has often been asked to clarify the circumstances under which a
sentence of death is permissible.8 0 In Enmund v. Florida,8 1 the Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a death sentence for a defendant who par-
ticipated in a crime in which a life was taken but whose conduct did not
reenacted statutes allowing for death sentences in some cases of child rape, but the
Tennessee Supreme Court had already invalidated its statute by the time Coker was
decided. See id. at 595 (citing Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977)) (not-
ing Tennessee Supreme Court's invalidation of child rape statute). Thus, the
Court recognized that Georgia was "the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the
... time that authorize [d] a sentence of death when the rape victim [was] an adult
woman." Id. at 595-96. But see Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1134 (opining that com-
paratively small number of states that had reenacted capital rape statutes was based
more on legislatures' focus being primarily on constitutionality of new capital sen-
tencing statutes, not on which crimes should be made death-eligible).
77. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. The Court concluded that "the legislative rejection
of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that
death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult wo-
man." Id. at 597 (noting lack of legislative support from states for capital rape
sentencing). In addressing the fact that rape in Georgia was punishable by death
while deliberate murder, absent aggravating circumstances, was not, the Court
concluded that "[i]t is difficult to accept the notion, and we do not, that the rapist,
with or without aggravating circumstances, should be punished more heavily than
the deliberate killer as long as the rapist does not himself take the life of his vic-
tim." Id. at 600 (rejecting capital punishment for rapists as disproportionate to
crime of rape); see also Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1133 (summarizing five main
factors identified by Court in concluding that punishment of death for rape was
contrary to social trend away from such severe punishments).
78. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 990-92 (1978)
(discussing significance of Coker decision and potential impact on future Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence); Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1135 (noting that Court
extended Coker rationale to other crimes, finding capital punishment unconstitu-
tional for armed robbery and kidnapping); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 11,
at 1206-07 (questioning whether death penalty would be upheld for crimes such as
child rape, espionage or treason).
79. For a discussion of the return of capital rape statutes, see infra notes 111-
40 and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of specific cases decided by the Court in its efforts to
clarify the law surrounding capital punishment, see infra notes 81-110 and accom-
panying text.
81. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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directly lead to the victim's death. 82 The defendant was the getaway driver
in an armed robbery and was not present when the victims were fatally
shot.8 3 The Court rejected the imposition of a capital sentence on one
"who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take
place or that lethal force will be employed," as disproportionate.8 4
Five years later, the Court considered a variation of the circumstances
of Enmund in Tison v. Arizona.8 5 The petitioners in Tison were tried for
and convicted of felony murder stemming from their involvement in a
prison break that eventually led to the murder of four people. 86 Follow-
ing their conviction under Arizona's felony murder rule, the petitioners
were sentenced to death. 8 7 The Supreme Court ruled that although the
petitioners did not actually commit the murders, their level of involve-
ment was adequate to warrant imposition of the death penalty. 88 The
82. See id. at 787 (reciting specific issue before Court). Specifically, the peti-
tioner asked "whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to
take life." Id.
83. See id. at 784-85 (providing facts). It was not contested at trial that En-
mund had not actually committed the murders, and the prosecutor stated in his
closing argument that Enmund's codefendant had pulled the trigger. See id. at 784
(same). Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court, hearing Enmund's appeal,
found no evidence that he was present when the planned robbery turned into a
murder. See id. at 786 (same).
84. Id. at 797 (rejecting Florida's felony murder statute as unconstitutional).
Drawing a parallel between Enmund and Coker, the Court held that "we have the
abiding conviction that the death penalty, which is 'unique in its severity and irrev-
ocability,' is an excessive penalty for the robber who, as such, does not take human
life." Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (Stewart, Powell and
Stevens, JJ., joint opinion)) (noting disproportionality of capital sentence for one
whose involvement in crime is not directly related to fatal consequences).
85. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
86. See id. at 139-41 (stating facts). The petitioners, who were brothers, smug-
gled a number of guns into a prison to assist their father and his cellmate in their
escape. See id. at 139 (same). They then participated in the hijacking of a vehicle
passing on the highway with the intention of stealing the car. See id. at 140 (same).
After the successful theft of the victims' vehicle, the petitioners' father and his
cellmate murdered the driver and three passengers of the hijacked car, all mem-
bers of the same family, including a two-year-old boy. See id. (same). According to
the petitioners' statements, they were not present at the scene of the actual
murders but had been ordered away by their father and the other triggerman. See
id. at 141 (same).
87. See id. at 141-43 (reciting procedural history). In passing sentence, the
trial judge did not consider the brothers' "participation [in the murders] was rela-
tively minor," but instead found that the "participation of each petitioner in the
crimes giving rise to the application of the felony murder rule ... was very substan-
tial." Id. at 142 (citation omitted) (noting significant nature of petitioners' contri-
butions to underlying crimes). The judge also found that each petitioner could
have reasonably foreseen "that his conduct would cause ... or create a grave risk of
• . .death." Id. (citation omitted) (noting foreseeability of danger apparent to
petitioners).
88. See id. at 158 (discussing and differentiating substantial involvement of
petitioners in actions necessary to facilitate homicides). The Court also noted that
a number of state courts had interpreted Enmund to permit the imposition of capi-
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Court determined that the petitioners demonstrated a reckless disregard
for human life, evidenced by their facilitation of the prison break and
their assistance in flagging down the victims' car.89 The Court held that
the circumstances in Tison and Enmund were sufficiently different that the
holdings in the two cases were not inconsistent.90 The rule resulting from
Enmund and Tison is that while minor involvement in a crime in which a
life is taken is insufficient to warrant a capital sentence, death may be im-
posed if a defendant's participation was substantial and his mental state
reached the level of reckless indifference to human life.9 1
3. Two New Breeds of Defendants: Executing Juveniles and the Mentally
Retarded
In the two years that followed Tison, the Supreme Court tackled two
substantial issues in capital jurisprudence-the constitutionality of execut-
ing juveniles and that of executing the mentally retarded.9 2 Under the
common law, it had long been recognized that juveniles, even those as
young as seven years old, could be sentenced to death in certain circum-
stances. 9 3 Continuing its trend of reviewing the constitutionality of the
death penalty, the Court, in the late 1980s, addressed whether juveniles
tal sentences on defendants whose "substantial participation in a violent felony
under circumstances likely to result in the loss of innocent human life" made the
deaths foreseeable. Id. at 154 (presenting cases with factual bases similar to Tison).
89. See id. at 157-58 (differentiating petitioners' involvement in underlying
crimes). The Court later concluded:
[T] he reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly
culpable mental state . . .that may be taken into account in making a
capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though
also not inevitable, lethal result.
Id. (finding petitioners' level of participation sufficiently high to warrant imposi-
tion of death sentences).
90. See id. at 144 (distinguishing Tison from Enmund). The Court held that
"major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference
to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement." Id. at
158.
91. See Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and the
Non-Triggerman: The Scales of Justice are Broken, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 123, 145-47
(1989) (discussing elimination of "intent to kill" requirement to qualify defendants
for capital accomplice liability); see also Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. Rmv. 1103, 1161-63 (1990) (illus-
trating potential problems associated with application of Enmund-Tison rule).
92. For a discussion of specific holdings on these issues, see infra notes 96-107
and accompanying text.
93. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *23-24 (identifying England's
common law as permitting execution of juvenile offenders possibly as young as
seven years old); MATTHEW HALE, 1 PLEAS OF THE CROWN *24-29 (establishing re-
buttable presumption of incapacity to commit felony at age fourteen).
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remained eligible for capital sentencing in Thompson v. Oklahoma9 4 and
Stanford v. Kentucky.95
In Thompson, the Court invalidated an Oklahoma law that permitted
the execution of fifteen-year-old offenders as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.9 6 Specifically, the Court noted that no state other than
Oklahoma had statutorily allowed for the execution of those younger than
sixteen when their crimes were committed. 97 Furthermore, the Court de-
termined that defendants under age sixteen have a reduced appreciation
for the consequences of their actions. 98 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that, based on the national consensus in opposition to such prac-
tices and the decreased culpability of young juveniles, capital sentences
were unconstitutional for offenders fifteen years old and younger as con-
trary to evolving standards of decency. 99
In Stanford, the Court, finding "neither a historical nor a modern soci-
etal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any
person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age," upheld the permissibility of
94. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
95. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Stanford was decided concurrently with a companion
case, Wilkins v. Missouri. See id. at 368 (noting consolidation of cases).
96. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (concluding that Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments are offended by executing offenders who were less than sixteen at
time their offenses were committed).
97. See id. at 829. The Court found that persons under age sixteen may not
vote or serve on a jury in any state, purchase pornographic materials in any state,
drive a vehicle without parental consent in forty-nine states or marry without pa-
rental consent in forty-six states. See id. at 824 (examining ages of majority in other
states). Additionally, the Court found that all states had enacted legislation
"designating the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction at no less than 16."
Id. Accordingly, the Court established that these legislative decisions "[are] consis-
tent with the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, that the
normal 15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult."
Id. at 824-25 (summarizing rationale for rejecting execution of fifteen-year-old of-
fenders); see also Michael Mello, Executing Rapists: A Reluctant Essay on the Ethics of
Legal Scholarship, 4 WM. & MARvJ. WOMEN & L. 129, 138-39 (1997) (detailing ages
of majority in multiple states and outlining rights and restrictions placed on mi-
nors by various states).
98. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 ("Inexperience, less education, and less in-
telligence makes the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by
mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."). The Court continued, stating:
"The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities
of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehen-
sible as that of an adult." Id. (discussing maturity level of defendants under age
sixteen).
99. See id. at 836-37 (restating holding and rationale). "Given the lesser culpa-
bility of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's
fiduciary obligations to its children," the Court found that neither deterrence nor
retribution were acceptable justifications for executing juveniles who were fifteen
years old at the time of their offenses, rendering such sentences cruel and unusual
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. See id. (rejecting arguments in
support of executing fifteen-year-old offenders).
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capital sentences for juveniles in that age range. l0 0 The Court found that
the lack of a consensus against executing juveniles aged sixteen or seven-
teen demonstrated that the evolving standards of decency in American
society did not prohibit executing such defendants.'10 Thus, the constitu-
tionally permissible minimum age for imposition of a death sentence in
the United States was set at sixteen.'
0 2
The same day the Court decided Stanford, it also decided Peniy v.
Lynaugh,10 3 a case that challenged Texas's practice of executing mentally
retarded offenders. 10 4 The defendant was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death by a Texas court despite substantial evidence of mild to
moderate mental retardation. 10 5 The Supreme Court found no constitu-
tional infirmity in affirming the defendant's capital sentence, holding that
a defendant's mental retardation, standing alone, was insufficient to pre-
clude a sentence of death.' 0 6 The Court also found no evidence of a na-
100. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (recounting holding and rationale). At the
time the case was decided, the Court noted that twenty-two of the thirty-seven
states that permitted capital punishment made no express exemption for those
who were sixteen at the time their crimes were committed, and only twelve of the
thirty-seven prohibited such sentences on seventeen-year-olds. See id. at 370 (find-
ing no consensus against executing sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders).
101. See id. at 369-71 (noting that petitioner's only valid claim was based on
evolving standards of decency because execution of sixteen and seventeen-year-
olds was commonplace at time of Framers). The Court rejected the argument
that, because no clear consensus existed in support of or in opposition to execut-
ing such offenders, the process was unconstitutional. See id. at 373 (placing bur-
den of demonstration of national consensus on petitioners).
102. See, e.g., John R. Frank, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky: Did the Court Bite the
Constitutional Bullet?, 23 AKRON L. REv. 547, 559-60 (1990) (discussing implications
of Stanford decision); Shelia L. Sanders, Comment, The Imposition of Capital Punish-
ment on Juvenile Offenders: Drawing the Line, 19 S.U. L. REv. 141, 148-52 (1992) (out-
lining and restating conclusions reached in Thompson and Stanford and predicting
effects of those holdings on future capital jurisprudence).
103. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
104. See id. at 307 (summarizing issue).
105. See id. at 307-11 (reciting facts). At a pre-trial competency hearing, it was
determined that Penry's IQ was between fifty and sixty-three, indicative of mild to
moderate mental retardation. See id. at 307-08 (noting extent of petitioner's
mental defect). There was additional testimony that Penry's social maturity was
equivalent to that of a nine or ten-year-old. See id. at 308 (discussing Penry's social-
ization skills).
106. See id. at 340 (summarizing holding and rationale). The Court con-
cluded that while "mental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a defendant's
culpability for a capital offense ... we cannot conclude... that the Eighth Amend-
ment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry's ability
convicted of a capital offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation
alone." Id. (rejecting argument that mental retardation should disqualify defend-
ants from death eligibility). Additionally, the Court found that "[s]o long as
sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental retarda-
tion in imposing sentence, an individualized determination whether death is the
appropriate punishment can be made in each particular case." Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (supporting case-by-case determination of level of mental re-
tardation and its effects on particular defendant's behavior).
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tional consensus against executing the mentally retarded and accordingly
rejected petitioner's argument that such a practice was at odds with the
evolving standards of decency described in Trap.
10 7
In Stanford and Penry, the Court emphasized the lack of a national
consensus prohibiting executions ofjuveniles aged sixteen and seventeen
as well as mentally retarded defendants. 10 8 The Court stated that if impos-
ing capital sentences on these classes of defendants violated evolving stan-
dards of decency, it should be reflected in the actions of state legislatures
in prohibiting such sentences. 10 9 Although the Court noted that a legisla-
tive survey indicated no clear consensus among the states against execut-
ing juveniles and mentally retarded defendants, the Court would see a
rapid shift in states' positions within the following decade and a half.1 10
III. THE REBIRTH OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR RAPE: THE
COKER LOOPHOLE
A. The Supreme Court Left the Door Open a Crack ...
When the Supreme Court decided Coker v. Georgia, it addressed the
specific issue presented to it-namely, the constitutionality of the death
107. See id. The Court implied, however, that should a consensus someday
emerge against executing mentally retarded individuals, such a practice may come
to violate such evident "evolving standards." See id.; see also Lyn Entzeroth, Putting
the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a Na-
tional Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. RFv.
911, 932-41 (2001) (charting emergence of national consensus against execution
of mentally retarded defendants and discussing what additional requirements were
necessary to overturn Penry); Joanna Hall, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia: National
Consensus or Six-Person Opinion?, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 361, 370
(2004) (analyzing what Court considers "national consensus"); Lyndsey Sloan,
Comment, Evolving Standards of Decency: The Evolution of a National Consensus Grant-
ing the Mentally Retarded Sanctuary, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 351, 374-79 (2003) (discussing
emergence of national consensus against executing mentally retarded offenders).
For a discussion of Atkins v. Virginia and the Court's recognition of such a consen-
sus in 2002, see infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
108. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (noting that prohibitions of Eighth Amend-
ment are not limited to punishments that were cruel and unusual at time of Con-
stitution's ratification but can also hinge on evidence of national consensus as
representation of evolving standards of decency); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 369-70 (1988) (stating that without historical basis for argument against capi-
tal punishment, petitioner must establish national consensus against application of
punishment in given circumstances).
109. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 ("In discerning those 'evolving standards,' we
have looked to objective evidence of how our society views a particular punishment
today. The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is
the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.") (citations omitted); Stanford,
492 U.S. at 369 (considering state and federal legislative decisions indicative of
punishments that society considers cruel and unusual).
110. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371-72. For a discussion of
the Court's re-examination of the holdings in Penry and Stanford, see infra notes
141-58 and accompanying text.
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penalty for the crime of rape.11" In Coker, the challenged statute made no
reference to the age of the victim, stating that the commission of any rape
was sufficient to warrant imposition of a sentence of death.1 12 In an ap-
parent effort to qualify the circumstances of his particular case, however,
Coker's appellate argument sought to differentiate his crime from those
for which other states sanctioned the death penalty, arguing that execu-
tion was an excessive and disproportionate punishment for the "rape of an
adult woman."' " 3 The Court seized upon this phraseology, and its opin-
ion made numerous references to the "adult woman" language. 114 De-
spite the fact that these words were not a part of the statute at issue in
Coker, they made their way into the holding. 115 Some critics and
lawmakers identified the Court's language as indicative of its permission to
execute rapists whose victims were not adults but children. 116
I11. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 586 (1977) ("Coker was granted a
writ of certiorari ... limited to the single claim, rejected by the Georgia court, that
the punishment of death for rape violates the Eighth Amendment ....").
112. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972) ("[A] person convicted of rape shall
be punished by death or by imprisonment."), invalidated by Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977), superseded by GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (2005). Rape was defined,
under this section, as "carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will.
Carnal knowledge in rape occurs when there is any penetration of the female sex
organ by the male sex organ." Id. (defining rape). There was no requirement that
the victim be over a certain age to qualify the assailant for death, merely that the
rape occur as statutorily defined and the victim be female. See id.
113. See Brief of Petitioner, Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (No. 75-5444), available at 1976
WL 181481, at *21 (noting that "[w]hile the rape of an adult woman is a serious
crime, it almost nowhere except in Georgia [is] viewed today as warranting the
punishment of death"); see also Bailey, supra note 20, at 1364 ("The Supreme Court
used the phrase 'adult woman' in Coker because the facts in Coker presented only
the rape of an adult woman.").
114. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 ("[W]e seek guidance in history and from
the objective evidence of the country's present judgment concerning the accepta-
bility of death as a penalty for rape of an adult woman."); see also State v. Wilson,
685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 & n.2 (La. 1996) (cataloguing fourteen instances in Coker
where Court made specific reference to "adult woman" language), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1259 (1997).
115. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (reciting specific question and holding). The
Court "concluded that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and exces-
sive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." Id. Although the "adult woman"
language appears nowhere in the Court's concise holding, it has become inherent
in nearly every subsequent recitation of the Coker decision. For examples of the
overstatement of the Coker holding, see infra note 116.
116. See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 20, at 3-4 (presenting holding of Cokeras
prohibiting death penalty for "rape of an adult woman"); Glazer, supra note 20, at
83 (noting "adult woman" language in Coker holding); Rayburn, supra note 13, at
1132 (including "adult woman" in description of Coker holding); Rosenberg & Ro-
senberg, supra note 11, at 1203 (same); Volokh, supra note 11, at 1967-68 (re-
marking about "adult woman" language in Coker); Meister, supra note 20, at 199
(differentiating Coker based on "adult woman" language).
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B. . . . and Louisiana Caught Its Foot
1. Introduction and Passage of the Statute
In March 1995, the Louisiana House of Representatives reviewed a
bill, House Resolution 55, which proposed amending the state's rape stat-
ute to permit the execution of offenders convicted of rape where the vic-
tim was less than twelve years old.' 17 The bill was referred to the House
Administration of Justice Committee where considerable debate occurred
and testimony was taken about whether death was a disproportionate pen-
alty for a rape in which no life was taken.1 8 Eventually, the committee
approved the bill by a divided vote of 4-3 with one member abstaining.
119
The full house then passed the bill by a vote of 79-22.120
Following approval by the house, the bill was transferred to the senate
for its review and approval.' 21 The Senate Judiciary Committee voted
unanimously to approve the bill, and it subsequently passed the full sen-
ate, without debate, by a vote of 34-1.122 Governor Edwin Edwards signed
the bill on June 17, and it became effective in August 1995.123
2. A Judicial Challenge Upheld by Louisiana's Supreme Court
In 1996, barely a year after the enactment of the aggravated rape stat-
ute, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the statute's constitutionality
117. See H.B. 55, 1995 Reg. Sess. (La. 1995) (proposing to amend La. R.S.
14:42(C) to permit capital sentencing for child rapists).
118. See Minutes of Meeting, Louisiana House Committee on Administration
of Criminal Justice (Apr. 19, 1995) (reporting debate among Committee members
and testimony of expert witnesses) (on file with author).
119. See id. (reporting Committee vote). Upon consideration of the bill
before the entire House of Representatives, an amendment was proposed that
would have permitted castration of child rapists in lieu of the death penalty. See
1995 La. Acts 937 (recounting proposed amendment of Representative McCain to
sanction castration of rapists instead of capital punishment). The bill's sponsor,
Representative Schneider, objected, and a full vote of the House membership re-
jected the proposed amendment. See id. at 937-38 (reporting objection to and
rejection of amendment proposal by vote of 27-79). A second amendment was
then proposed that would have added castration as a required punishment, in ad-
dition to the death penalty, for offenders convicted of aggravated rape. See id. at
938 (reporting introduction and objection to second amendment). The second
amendment failed as well by a margin of 23-73. See id. at 938-39 (noting failure to
pass amendment).
120. 1995 La. Acts at 939 (summarizing vote to pass bill and listing individual
representatives' votes).
121. See Minutes of Meeting, Louisiana Senate Judiciary Committee (May 30,
1995) (summarizing introduction of bill to Committee and presenting abstract of
debate and testimony) (on file with author).
122. See id. (reporting Committee vote); 1995 La. Acts 1891 (reporting vote of
full Senate).
123. See Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1136 (describing circumstances of enact-
ment of capital rape statute).
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in State v. Wilson.124 Appellees in Wilson were separately charged with ag-
gravated rape under the statute, and each filed a motion to quash their
indictments on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. 125 In
each case, the trial court granted the motion to quash, and the State
appealed.
12 6
Appellees argued that the imposition of a death sentence for aggra-
vated rape violated the United States and Louisiana Constitutions because
it was cruel and unusual. 127 First, appellees contended that the punish-
ment was excessive and disproportionate to the crime being punished and
that a sentence of death cannot be imposed for a crime that does not
result in death. 128 Second, Appellees argued that the statute's language
124. 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997). Wilson was
decided concurrently with a companion case, State v. Bethley. See id. at 1065 (listing
details of charges and court's decision to consolidate appeals).
125. See id. at 1064-65 (repeating issue and question in case). Petitioner Wil-
son was charged with the aggravated rape of a five-year-old girl. See id. at 1064
(providing factual background in both cases). Petitioner Bethley was charged with
raping three girls, ages five, seven and nine, one of whom was his daughter. See id.
at 1065 (same). It was also alleged that Bethley was aware that he was HIV positive
at the time of his crimes. See id. (same).
126. See id. (outlining procedural posture). Both petitioners raised the same
Eighth Amendment objections to the statute, but the trial courts split in their ratio-
nales for finding the statute invalid. See id. (same). The trial court in Wilson found
the statute unconstitutional on its face, and the court in Bethley found the statute
itself constitutional but the class of death-eligible defendants unconstitutionally
broad. See id. (same).
127. See id. at 1065 (arguing that punishment was unconstitutional). Appel-
lees' brief asserts that "the statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 3 and 20 of the Louisiana
Constitution." Brief of Appellee Patrick Dewayne Bethley at 2, Wilson, 685 So. 2d
1063 (No. 96-KA-2076) (on file with author), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997).
128. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 127, at 8 (outlining arguments against
capital punishment on bases of lack of proportionality and excessive nature of cap-
ital punishment). Relying on the actions of legislatures and sentencing juries, ap-
pellees alleged existence of an "overwhelming national consensus that capital
punishment is a disproportionate penalty for the rape of a child" and urged the
Louisiana Supreme Court to invalidate the statute on that basis. See id. Appellees
asserted that a death sentence is always disproportionate to a crime that does not
result in the victim's death. See id. at 22. Citing Coker, Enmund and Tison, appellees
expressed that a death sentence can only be permitted when a finding is made that
a defendant's actions demonstrated a reckless indifference to human life. See id. &
nn.26-27. Appellees averred:
Since Furman, the United States Supreme Court has never affirmed a
death sentence in a case in which a death did not occur. In that time, the
Court has twice considered the proportionality of capital punishment for
a felony murderer who did not kill. In Enmund ... the Court held that
capital punishment is disproportionate for the felony murderer who does
not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place. In Tison...
the Court expanded this holding somewhat, ruling that "major participa-
tion in [a] felony . . . , combined with reckless indifference to human life, is
sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement" for the felony
murderer.
Id. Appellees continued: "R.S. 14:42 requires a finding that the defendant partici-
pated in a felony, aggravated rape. However, it does not require a finding that a
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permits its application in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 129 Last, ap-
pellees asserted that the imposition of such a penalty did not achieve the
goals of punishment.
130
Rejecting appellees' objections, the Louisiana Supreme Court over-
turned the trial court decisions, finding the capital rape law consistent
with the Louisiana and United States Constitutions.1 3 1 The court dis-
missed the argument that Coker prohibited the imposition of capital pun-
ishment for a defendant convicted of raping a child.132 With regard to the
statute, the court explained that it was not within its proper authority to
overrule the will of the people, ostensibly expressing its unwillingness to
overturn legislative actions it considered to have been legitimately en-
acted.133 The justices further rejected the argument that the statute was
unconstitutional because no other states had similar provisions in their
laws. 134 The state supreme court opined that Louisiana's status as the only
state to permit such a punishment did not indicate that the statute was
death took place and that the defendant manifested a reckless indifference to
human life. Accordingly, it is unconstitutional under the holdings of Enmund,
Coker and Tison." Id.
129. See id. at 30 (contending that lack of guidance for jury in passing sen-
tence will lead to arbitrary and capricious determinations). Appellees asserted that
the capital rape statute, standing alone, failed to narrow the class of death-eligible
child rapists because it lacked statutory aggravating circumstances. See id. (citing
lack of objective guidance to assist juries in determining sentences). Appellees
claimed that the section of Louisiana's sentencing statute that prescribes aggravat-
ing factors was only intended to be applied to first-degree murder cases, as evi-
denced by one sentence of the statute which contained a reference to "the impact
that the death of the victim has had on the family members." See id. (maintaining
that statutory factors then in existence were insufficient to apply in capital rape
sentencing). Because no specific list of statutory aggravating factors existed, as
required for capital sentencing under the United States and Louisiana Constitu-
tions, appellees contended that the statute must be declared unconstitutional. See
id. at 32-33 (same).
130. See id. at 22-27 (explaining that neither retribution nor deterrence is suf-
ficiently accomplished by imposing death on child rapists).
131. See Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1064 (summarizing holding).
132. See id. at 1067 (finding that decision of state legislature to amend statute
to permit death sentences for child rape was legitimate exercise of legislative pre-
rogative). Specifically, the court found that "[a] 'maturing society,' through its
legislature has recognized the degradation and devastation of child rape, and the
permeation of harm resulting to victims of rape [under age twelve] . . . . The
damage a child suffers as a result of rape is devastating to the child as well as to the
community." Id.
133. See id. ("The courts must exercise caution in asserting their views over
those of the people as announced through their elected representatives.").
134. See id. at 1068 (concluding that because other states previously punished
child rape with death, trend was discernable and credence was lent to Louisiana
Legislature's passage of capital rape statute). The court cited several statutes from
the Coker era, which were earlier invalidated by the Supreme Court, as examples of
a continuous trend in the area of capital sentencing condoning death sentences
for child rapists. See id. (identifying states that previously punished child rape with
death and concluding such evidence indicated ongoing inclination toward permit-
ting execution for such offenders).
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cruel and unusual but did prove that a trend in favor of such penalties had
yet to reach other states.1 35 The court ultimately held that "given the ap-
palling nature of the crime, the severity of the harm inflicted upon the
victim, and the harm imposed on society, the death penalty is not an ex-
cessive penalty for the crime of rape when the victim is a child under the
age of twelve years old."
1 36
The case was appealed, unsuccessfully, to the United States Supreme
Court as Bethley v. Louisiana.1 3 7 Despite the Court's decision not to hear
the appeal, three Justices took an unusual measure and published a state-
ment regarding the Court's denial of certiorari.13 8 Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, stated that although the Court would not
hear the case because it lacked finality of judgment, " [i]t is well settled
that... [the Court's] decision to deny a petition for writ of certiorari does
not in any sense constitute a ruling on the merits of the case in which the
writ is sought."' 39 The inference from this statement is weighty and influ-
ential; it suggests that the three Justices believed that although Bethley was
not ripe for resolution, the issues it presented were important and worthy
of adjudication when the procedural posture is correct at some point in
the future. 1
40
IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT RULINGS WITH CONSEQUENCES ON THE
CAPITAL RAPE DEBATE
A. Moratorium on Executing the Mentally Retarded: Atkins v. Virginia
41
In 2002, thirteen years after the Court upheld executions of mentally
retarded defendants in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court reversed its holding in
135. See id at 1069 ("The fact that Louisiana is presently the sole state al-
lowing the death penalty for the rape of a child is not conclusive. There is no
constitutional infirmity in a state's statute simply because that jurisdiction chose to
be first."). Further addressing this issue, the court expounded that "[i]t is quite
possible that other states are awaiting the outcome of the challenges to the consti-
tutionality of the .. .[Louisiana] statute before enacting their own [capital rape
statutes]." Id. (rejecting argument that sufficient time had elapsed and no other
states had amended their laws in manner similar to Louisiana).
136. Id. at 1070.
137. 520 U.S. 1259, 1259 (1997) (denying writ of certiorari).
138. See id. (publishing statement of Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer, respecting denial of certiorari); see also Moeller, supra note 20, at
623 (discussing nature of Justices' decision to include statement accompanying
certiorari denial and noting such statements indicate that Court's decisions not to
review particular cases are not necessarily approvals of challenged laws).
139. Bethley, 520 U.S. at 1259.
140. Accord Palmer, supra note 20, at 856 (opining that Bethley statement was
invitation to potential future petitioners to challenge similar laws); see State v.
Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 650 n.ll (Utah 1997) ("These Justices suggest that certio-
rari may have been denied only because the Louisiana decision does not represent
a final judgment in the case ... .
141. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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that case in Atkins v. Virginia.14 2 Atkins was sentenced to death despite
expert testimony indicating that he was mildly mentally retarded. 143 The
Supreme Court reversed his sentence, holding that "a national consensus
ha[d] developed against (executing mentally retarded offenders].' 4 4
The Court examined legislative developments in the thirteen years since
Penry, finding that a substantial number of states enacted legislation specif-
ically prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded.' 45 This led the
Court to conclude that "[t] he practice ... has become truly unusual, and
it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it."' 14 6 The
Court then identified two additional reasons in its death penalty jurispru-
dence consistent with the legislative consensus: that executing mentally
retarded offenders satisfied neither aim of capital punishment-retribu-
tion and deterrence-and that mentally retarded offenders' reduced intel-
lectual and cognitive capacities cannot support their punishment by
death.' 47 Despite rigorous dissents by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
142. See id. at 321 (rejecting continued imposition of capital sentences on
mentally retarded defendants and overruling Penry).
143. See id. at 308-09 (summarizing expert testimony presented in Atkins's de-
fense). A forensic psychologist testified on Atkins's behalf that the defendant was
mildly mentally retarded with an IQ of fifty-nine. See id. (explaining procedures
and reliability of IQ test). This IQ was approximately the same as the defendant's
in Penry, who was determined to have an IQ between fifty and sixty-three. See Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989) (noting Penry's multiple IQ tests and scores),
abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
144. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. The Court later held that "[c]onstruing and ap-
plying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our evolving standards of decency,
we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution
places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life of a mentally
retarded offender." Id. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. See id. at 313-15 (discussing state legislatures' reactions to Peny). Outlin-
ing the period between the Penry and Atkins decisions, the Court found that eigh-
teen states had statutorily rejected permitting the execution of mentally retarded
offenders and that a nineteenth had prohibited such practices the year before
Penry. See id. (recounting measures enacted and discussed in particular states).
Additionally, the Court stated:
It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change. Given the well-known fact that
anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing pro-
tections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the com-
plete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to con-
duct such executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society
views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.
Id. at 315-16 (footnote omitted).
146. Id. at 316.
147. See id. at 318-21 (outlining and rejecting additional justifications for exe-
cuting mentally retarded defendants). The Court concluded that with respect to
retribution, "the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on
the culpability of the offender," and that "the lesser culpability of the mentally
retarded offender surely does not merit" a death sentence. Id. at 319. Addressing
deterrence, the Court concluded that those offenders who are mentally retarded
and have a reduced capability to understand and process information will be un-
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Scalia, the majority in Atkins successfully overturned the Penry decision
made just thirteen years earlier. 1 48
B. Overturning Stanford-Juvenile Defendants No Longer Eligible for
Execution: Roper v. Simmons1
49
Three years after the Court decided Atkins, another controversial
death penalty statute reached the Justices in Roper v. Simmons, urging re-
consideration of the constitutionality of executing juveniles. 1 50 Roper was
a challenge to Stanford v. Kentucky, presenting the question of whether the
execution of defendants who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the
time of their crimes was constitutional.' 5 1 Given another opportunity to
clarify its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court overruled Stanford
and found such sentences unconstitutional. 152
The Supreme Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause precludes a sentence of death for juvenile offenders. 153 The Court
deterred by the prospect of execution as punishment for their actions because the
possibility and nature of punishment often does not influence their conduct. See
id. at 319-20 (rejecting deterrence as legitimate objective of executing mentally
retarded defendants). Additionally, the Court found that the "lesser ability of
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation" makes
them more susceptible to being convicted on the basis of uncontested aggravating
circumstances, and that "[m]entally retarded defendants may be less able to give
meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their
demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes." Id. at 320-21.
148. See id. at 321 (reciting holding of Court). Chief Justice Rehnquist as-
serted that the majority's argument about a national consensus was mere lip ser-
vice to obfuscate the real motivation behind the majority's opinion-that the
individual Justices subjectively preferred to prohibit execution of the mentally re-
tarded-and not demonstrative of any consensus at all. See id. at 322 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's determination of national consensus). Writ-
ing separately, Justice Scalia also dissented, contending that the Court's decision
"find[s] no support in the text or history of the Eighth Amendment," and that
"[the ruling] does not even have support in current social attitudes regarding the
conditions that render an otherwise just death penalty inappropriate." Id. at 337-
38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's general Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence). Justice Scalia opined that an insufficient number of states opposed the
execution of the mentally retarded to constitute a national consensus. See id. at
343 (noting that considerably higher degrees of agreement were required in Coker
and Enmund before the proscription of death penalty was warranted in those
cases). Justice Scalia also argued that an insufficient amount of time had elapsed
since Penry to determine the existence of a true consensus. See id. at 344 ("It is
myopic to base sweeping constitutional principles upon the narrow experience of
a few years." (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
150. See id. at 1187 (noting Court's willingness to reconsider question of exe-
cuting juveniles within fifteen years of precedential adjudication).
151. See id. (reciting issue and context of Roper).
152. See id. at 1190 (summarizing acceptance of case and affirmation of
verdict).
153. See id. at 1198 (explaining rejection of Stanford and restating holding).
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also drew a number of correlations with the Atkins decision of three years
earlier. 154 The Court found evidence of a national consensus against im-
posing capital sentences on juveniles. 155 It further expounded that "the
death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders"
and that characteristics implicit in the nature ofjuvenile offenders support
the conclusion that they "cannot with reliability be classified among the
worst offenders."'156 As in Atkins, Roper included vociferous dissents, pro-
vided by Justices O'Connor and Scalia. 157 The bell, however, could not be
154. See id. at 1192 (finding national consensus, similar to that identified in
Atkins, in opposition to execution ofjuvenile offenders). The Court drew an anal-
ogy between the manner in which legislatures have addressed juveniles sentenced
to death with the manner in which they had previously addressed similar penalties
on mentally retarded defendants, as addressed in Atkins. See id. at 1193 ("The ...
[eighteen] States that have abandoned capital punishment for juvenile offenders
since Stanford is smaller than the number of States that abandoned capital punish-
ment for the mentally retarded after Penry; yet we think the same consistency of
direction of change has been demonstrated."). The Court further expounded:
As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case-the rejection
of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of
its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the
trend toward abolition of the practice-provide sufficient evidence that
today our society views juveniles, in the words Atkins used respecting the
mentally retarded, as "categorically less culpable than the average
criminal."
Id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
155. See id. at 1192 (identifying existence of national consensus against impos-
ing capital sentencing on juvenile defendants).
156. Id. at 1195. Speaking in general terms, the Court outlined three differ-
ences between adults and juveniles under eighteen, which it felt precluded such
juvenile offenders from suffering a sentence of death. See id. (introducing reasons
for disqualification of juveniles for capital punishment). First, the Court noted
that "a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often than in adults," and that "[t]hese qualities often result in impet-
uous and ill-considered actions and decisions." Id. (quotingJohnson v. Texas, 509
U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). Second, the Court found that 'juveniles are more vulnera-
ble or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure." Id. The third difference identified by the Court "is that the character of
a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed." Id. Justice Stevens concurred in the judg-
ment, reiterating his belief that the manner in which the Court approaches Eighth
Amendment cases must stress the importance of evaluating each case in light of
evolving standards of decency. See id. at 1205 (Stevens, J., concurring) (accentuat-
ing importance of interpreting Constitution in evolutionary manner as society con-
tinues to develop).
157. See id. at 1213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing preference for pro-
portionality issues addressed by Court to be resolved through individualized sen-
tencing procedures-where juries have ability to consider defendant's age and
immaturity as mitigating circumstances-rather than through categorical age-
based rules adopted by Court). Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the Court's
finding of a clear national consensus. See id. at 1216 ("[T]he objective evidence is
inconclusive; standing alone, it does not demonstrate that our society has repudi-
ated capital punishment of 17-year-old offenders in all cases."). She concluded
that "[w]ithout a clearer showing that a genuine national consensus forbids the
execution of such offenders, this Court should not substitute its own 'inevitably
subjective judgment' on how best to resolve this difficult moral question for the
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"unrung"; the Court overruled Stanford and injected additional uncer-
tainty into an area of law already replete with unpredictability.1
5 3
V. ATKINS-ROPER ANALYSIS OF LouIsIANA's CAPITAL RAPE STATUTE
Although Supreme Court decisions are fact-specific to the cases
presented, the Court's holdings can have a broad, sweeping impact on
legal disputes arising under similar circumstances. 15 9 Thus, each of the
Court's decisions informs potential litigants of the Court's positions on
related matters and questions of law. 160 Accordingly, the Court's holdings
judgments of the Nation's democratically elected legislatures." Id. at 1217 (citing
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Also dissenting was Justice Scalia who diverged from the plurality's determination
of a national consensus against executing juvenile offenders and echoed Justice
O'Connor's concerns about the broad nature of the rule presented by the plural-
ity. See id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Words have no meaning if the views of
less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus. Our
previous cases have required overwhelming opposition to a challenged practice,
generally over a long period of time.") (citation omitted). Justice Scalia criticized
the plurality for its characterization of forty-seven percent of the states, which per-
mit capital punishment-eighteen of thirty-eight-as a national consensus, noting
that in previous cases, such as Coker v. Georgia and Enmund v. Florida, more conclu-
sive percentages were required for the determination of a national consensus. See
id. (outlining parameters of "halfhearted" claims of national consensus by plural-
ity). Finally,Justice Scalia wrote of his dismay at the plurality's decision to consider
the standards and opinions of foreign countries and interest groups in making its
determination on the constitutionality of executing juveniles. See id. at 1226
("[T]he basic premise of the Court's argument-that American law should con-
form to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of hand.").
158. See Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in Interna-
tional Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1, 9-21 (2005) (describing multiple interpretive
theories utilized by Court in adjudicating death penalty cases, several of which
were employed in Roper); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rul-
ings, 83 N.C. L. REv. 847, 861 n.59 (2005) (including Roper as one of Court's com-
plicated constitutional interpretation cases); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right
Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 721-25 (2005) (illustrating compli-
cated and often confusing nature of Court's capital jurisprudence and explaining
Roper's role in evaluation process). See generally Brian W. Varland, Marking the Pro-
gress of a Maturing Society: Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Death Penalty Application
in Light of Evolving Standards of Decency, 28 HAMLINE L. REv. 311 (2005) (discussing
Court's recent trend of reevaluating issues decided comparatively recently and po-
tential future impact on constitutionality of capital sentencing).
159. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy
of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 389, 450-52 (2004) (describing how Court's decisions to grant or deny certio-
rari in particular cases can be bellwethers, indicative of future Court decisions);
The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 159 (1994)
(extrapolating that past Court decisions can be indicative of future jurisprudence).
160. See Frank Leonard Madia, Death Penalty Jurisprudence: The Difference Be-
tween Life and Death, 14J. SUFFOLK AcAD. L. 73, 100 (2000) ("Historical analysis of
death penalty jurisprudence can effectively predict future events."); Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Con-
stitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 359 (1995) (criti-
quing apparent convoluted nature of Court's various approaches to evaluating
constitutionality of capital punishment while explicating that understanding of
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in Atkins and Roper provide intimations about the Court's potential deci-
sion and rationale should it elect to decide a challenge to capital rape
laws. 161
Present-day objections to capital punishment for child rapists are not
dissimilar to those raised nearly thirty years ago in Coker.16 2 Many critics of
Louisiana's capital rape statute continue to rely primarily on the principle
of proportionality and contend that capital punishment is unjustly im-
posed on the criminal who does not take a human life. 163 They also make
arguments, similar to those made in Atkins and Roper, that based on the
characteristics of the particular offender and the peculiar nature of the
crime, the death penalty is an unjust and excessive punishment. 16 4 Based
on the analyses performed by the Court in invalidating the respective Vir-
ginia and Missouri laws in Atkins and Roper, the Louisiana child rape stat-
ute is cruel and unusual, and its continued application violates the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 1 65
Federalist supporters of the Louisiana statute would seek to exclude
the bases of the Court's holdings in Atkins and Roper because those cases
should have no precedential value in Louisiana. 166 On the contrary, the
cases can provide a wealth of information regarding the Court's possible
attitude toward its future capital jurisprudence.16 7 Most prominent is the
Court's precedents is essential to determination of future direction of death pen-
alty jurisprudence).
161. For a discussion of the potential impact of Atkins and Roper on the
Court's future capital jurisprudence as applied to capital rape statutes, see infra
notes 162-218 and accompanying text.
162. See generally Broughton, supra note 20 (identifying proportionality and
racial discrimination as most prevalent objections to capital rape sentencing, simi-
lar to Coker-era objections).
163. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 20, at 1371-72 (opining capital rape statutes
are excessive and disproportionate to crime); Lormand, supra note 20, at 1014
(contending that Wilson decision was inconsistent with Supreme Court's propor-
tionality jurisprudence as applied in Coker); Schaaf, supra note 20, at 347 (conclud-
ing that Louisiana's capital rape statute is disproportionate as well as arbitrary and
capricious in its application).
164. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (holding capital pun-
ishment cruel and unusual when imposed on juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (finding capital punishment cruel and unusual
when imposed on mentally retarded offenders).
165. For a discussion of the guidelines utilized in Atkins and Roper and their
application to child rape laws, see supra notes 159-64 and infra notes 166-218 and
accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 20, at 94-95 (arguing that so long as Louisiana
maintains sufficient safeguards to protect rights of accused, courts lack authority to
overrule voters' will as expressed through their legislative representatives). Glazer
also argues that courts are not permitted to substitute their own beliefs for the
legislative autonomy exerted by Louisiana's Legislature. See id. at 94 ("[Clourts
must avoid deciding the extent of criminal sanctions of the various states.").
167. See Meister, supra note 20, at 207-08 (criticizing Court's approach in At
kins while contemporaneously applying it to find capital child rape laws constitu-
tional); see also Sarah P. Newell, Note, State v. Gales: The First Test of Nebraska's New
System of Capital Punishment-The Battle Is Over, But What About the War?, 83 NEB. L.
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manner in which the Court reached its determinations that the chal-
lenged laws violated the Eighth Amendment. 1
68
In Atkins and Roper, the Court used a uniform approach to guide its
decision-making process. 16 9 First, the Court determined whether the
death penalty was cruel and unusual in the given case, based on its level of
excessiveness to the crime in light of societal evolving standards of de-
cency. 170 Next, the Court conducted an analysis of state legislative deci-
sions to determine whether a national consensus existed in support of or
against the issue being contested. 17 1 Last, it conducted an independent
evaluation, based on the Justices' own legal interpretations as to whether
the statute in question passed constitutional muster. 1 7 2 If the Court ever
examines the Louisiana statute or similar legislation from another state, it
should use this "Atkins-Roper" analysis and should ultimately conclude that
the statute is invalid.
1 73
A. Step 1: Ensuring Proportionality Between Crime and Punishment
In the first step, which involves a proportionality analysis, the Court
should find that a capital sentence is a grossly excessive punishment to the
crime of raping a child under twelve years old. 1 74 Modern capital juris-
prudence mandates that a life be taken to justify imposition of the death
penalty. 175 The Enmund and Tison rulings require either that defendants
Rv. 932, 934-35 (2005) (remarking on importance of proper interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent when analyzing legal principles, even where issues
presented are not identical).
168. See Meister, supra note 20, at 207 (objecting to nature of Court's analysis
in Atkins ).
169. For a discussion of the analysis used by the Court in Atkins and Roper, see
infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
170. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005) (examining propor-
tionality of punishment to crime in light of evolving standards of decency); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (same).
171. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-94 (performing legislative accounting of
states which abandoned juvenile executions); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16 (listing
jurisdictions within United States which condoned execution of mentally retarded
defendants).
172. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-200 (examining external factors that might
concur or conflict with Court's determination against constitutionality of juvenile
executions); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21 (performing subjective examination of any
considerations which support Court's holding against executing mentally retarded
defendants).
173. For a discussion of what the Court would likely conclude in performing
such an analysis, see infra notes 174-218 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 11, at 1968 ("[T]he Court must... [under-
stand] Coker as practically limiting the death penalty almost exclusively to murder
prosecutions .... And this limitation reflects a fairly clear and coherent (though
not uncontroversial) rule that the infliction of death should be reserved largely for
those who themselves inflict death.") (footnote omitted); Bailey, supra note 20, at
1371-72 (concluding death is unconstitutional punishment for child rape).
175. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) ("[T] he death penalty...
is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."); see
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kill, attempt to kill or intend to kill their victim, or that they display a
reckless indifference for human life in which they should foresee that
death could reasonably be expected to occur. 17 6 In the case of child rap-
ists, though their crimes may be unspeakably vile, that standard is simply
not met.
177
Many proponents of imposing the death penalty on child rapists rely
on the physical and psychological effects of the sexual assault on the child
victim to express the licentious nature of an offender's conduct.
178 Al-
though the effects on victims are certainly severe and excruciatingly pain-
ful, they typically do not rise to a life-threatening level. 179 Such arguments
fail to constitute intent to kill or a reckless disregard for human life as
required under the standard of Enmund and Tison.180 Consequently, an
also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 793 (1982) (rejecting imposition of capital
sentence on defendant who "did not take life, attempt to take it, or intend to take
[it]").
176. SeeTison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (finding that major partici-
pation in commission of felony combined with reckless indifference to human life
is sufficient to warrant death sentence); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 793 (requiring evi-
dence that defendant killed, intended to kill or attempted to kill to justify capital
sentence). The Wilson court relied on Tison to justify the imposition of a capital
sentence on a defendant who did not take his victim's life yet failed to take into
account that the Tison Court implied that death was required. See Glazer, supra
note 20, at 98 (noting flaw in Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of Tison);
see also Mello, supra note 97, at 157 ("Rape, as a class of crime, is no doubt gener-
ally viewed as less serious than murder." (quoting Brief of Respondent, Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444), available at 1977 WL 189754, at *18)).
But see Volokh, supra note 11, at 1970 ("Murder may be more heinous than adult
rape or child rape, but is it so qualitatively different that the Eighth Amendment
should preclude the death penalty for the latter two crimes?").
177. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 ("[R]ape by definition does not include the
death of or even the serious injury to another person."). Additionally, "in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, [rape] does not
compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life."
Id. The Coker Court made no distinction in describing the crime of rape based on
the age of the victim, whether an adult or a minor. See id. (depicting rape without
regard for age of victim).
178. Accord Meister, supra note 20, at 208-09 (describing physical, psychologi-
cal and social effects of child rape); Palmer, supra note 20, at 863-66 (recounting
traumatic effects of rape on children's bodies, minds and emotions); see State v.
Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996) (relying on severity of injury to child rape
victims to conclude that execution of child rapists is not disproportionate or exces-
sive), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997).
179. See, e.g., LINDA BROOKOVER BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE 51 (1989) (compar-
ing post-sexual assault reactions of rape victims to post-traumatic stress disorder-
severe in intensity and consequence on victims, but temporary in nature); PAT GI
MARTIN, RAPE, INCEST, AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 128-30 (1994) (depicting sadness,
moodiness, anxiety, interpersonal communication problems, headaches, depres-
sion and cognitive/learning problems to be among most common effects of child
sexual abuse/rape).
180. Accord Moeller, supra note 20, at 635 ("There is a basic difference in the
harm produced by rape and murder-the rape victim's life continues, [while] the
murder victim's does not."); see Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98 (noting that, despite phys-
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evaluation of the proportionality of a death sentence for the aggravated
rape of a child would fail the first step of an Atkins-Roper analysis.' 8 '
B. Step 2: The Quest for a National Consensus
The second step in the Atkins-Roper analysis requires a determination
of the existence or deficiency of a national consensus regarding the pun-
ishment under examination. 182 When the Court decided Cokerin 1977, it
found that Georgia was the only state that permitted the execution of a
rapist whose victim was an adult.18 3 Today, the Louisiana statute stands
alone, much as Georgia's capital rape statute did nearly three decades ago,
in authorizing execution of child rapists.1 84 The Atkins-Roper analysis re-
quires a clear consensus that the states agree that a punishment is imper-
missible for a given crime; consideration is also afforded to the speed and
consistency of the societal shift in one direction or another. 185 In the case
of executions of child rapists, the consensus is clear-no other state ac-
tively sanctions the execution of "the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life." 186 Additionally, in the interim years since the Coker decision,
only a few states have passed legislation permitting capital punishment for
rape crimes, and Louisiana is the only state whose supreme court has up-
held the punishment as constitutional.' 87 Ample time has passed for a
ical and psychological injuries inflicted by rapists, rape still does not rise to
equivalent level of murder and lacks requisite severity to warrant penalty of death).
181. See Fleming, supra note 20, at 749 (concluding death sentence for child
rape fails proportionality under Coker reasoning); Schaaf, supra note 20, at 359
(finding capital rape laws fail proportionality analysis as identified in Enmund-Coker
line of cases).
182. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192-94 (2005) (examining deci-
sions of state legislatures and sentencing juries to determine existence of national
consensus against executing juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-17
(2002) (examining legislative enactments and jury decisions in identifying consen-
sus against executing mentally retarded offenders).
183. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96 ("The upshot is that Georgia is the sole juris-
diction in the United States... that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape
victim is an adult woman .... ).
184. For a discussion of the plight of similar statutes in otherjurisdictions, see
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
185. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194 (concluding majority of states' rejection of
executing juveniles constituted national consensus); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16
(finding that eighteen states having amended their statutes to prohibit execution
of mentally retarded defendants was strong evidence of consensus); cf. Mello, supra
note 97, at 160 ("Two out of thirty-eight jurisdictions is not impressive objective
indicia that our 'evolving standards of decency' condone executing rapists.") (foot-
note omitted).
186. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598. Montana also allows for capital rape sentencing
but only for repeat offenders. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(3) (c) (i) (2003).
At the time of this Note, no one had been sentenced under the Montana statute.
See Mont. Dep't of Corr., Death Row: Who Are They?, http://www.cor.state.mt.us/
facts/deathrow.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (identifying all offenders on Mon-
tana's death row as convicted murderers).
187. See Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1137-39 (noting various states' discussions
of passing similar legislation, but also noting their failure to do so); Adam Liptak,
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trend to develop among states moving toward capital rape standards, but
no such trend has emerged.' 8 8 As such, the only possible conclusion is
that the national consensus is in favor of sparing the life of the child rapist,
and thus any statute that holds otherwise fails to comply with constitu-
tional standards. 189
C. Step 3: Identifying Any Compelling Reasons Against Consensus
The third step of the Atkins-Roper analysis would be the most difficult
to predict because an independent analysis must be performed to deter-
mine the existence or absence of a compelling reason for the Court to
disagree with the legislative consensus. 190 In Atkins, the Court discussed
whether the two principal aims of punishment, retribution and deter-
rence, were satisfied by permitting the execution of mentally retarded de-
fendants. 19 1 In Roper, the Court focused on the characteristics ofjuvenile
offenders and whether they were fully culpable for their actions given
their reduced age and maturity.19 2 The Court then proceeded to review
international statistics that indicated a world consensus, similar to that
among the states, had formed in opposition to the death penalty forjuve-
Louisiana Sentence Renews Debate on the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, at
20, available at 2003 WLNR 5646485 (discussing states' lack of legislative support
for argument in favor of constitutionality of Louisiana law). For a discussion of
other states' efforts to enact capital rape laws, see supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
188. Compare State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996) (suggesting
that given ample time, additional states will enact statutes similar to Louisiana's
capital rape statute), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997), with Coker, 433 U.S. at 595(finding period of five years sufficient to determine evidence of national trend in
passage of capital rape laws).
189. Accord Moeller, supra note 20, at 643 (insisting any evaluation of constitu-
tionality of Louisiana's capital rape statute must also evaluate decisions of other
states to not implement similar legislation); Shirley, supra note 20, at 1922 (criticiz-
ing Louisiana Supreme Court's decision upholding capital rape statute in spite of
Supreme Court indications that single jurisdiction's support is insufficient to com-
bat finding of national consensus); see Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96 (determining that
punishment sanctioned in only one state is strongly indicative of unconstitutional-
ity of such punishment).
190. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194-200 (considering moral culpability ofjuvenile
offenders and international perspectives on propriety of executing juveniles); At-
kins, 536 U.S. at 317-22 (evaluating characteristics of mentally retarded offenders
and finding no demonstrable reason to recede from conclusion that consensus
among state legislatures is correct in abolishing capital punishment of mentally
retarded defendants). But see Silversten, supra note 20, at 147 (reiterating that "the
Court can only strike down [a capital rape] statute if it offends the Constitution,
not because it offends the Justices").
191. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-22 (discounting effectiveness of retribution
and deterrence as capital goals when applied to mentally retarded offenders).
192. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194-98 (concluding that executing juvenile of-
fenders, whose moral culpability is not as fully developed as adult offenders, is
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nile offenders. 19 3 In both Atkins and Roper, the Court found no compel-
ling reason to warrant deviation from the finding of national
consensuses.194 An analysis of the constitutionality of executing child rap-
ists would properly include all of the above-listed considerations.1 9 5
Retribution and deterrence are the compelling aims that society seeks
to achieve through its criminal justice system. 19 6 Retribution is satisfied if
the punishment fits the crime.1 9 7 Rape, a criminal act in which no life is
taken, however, is disproportionate to a sentence of death even if the vic-
tim is a child. 198 Contemporary jurisprudence calls for penalties that are
193. See id. at 1198-200 (finding international community near-universally re-
jects execution ofjuvenile offenders); see also Anthony N. Bishop, The Death Penalty
in the United States: An International Human Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 1115,
1134-38 (2002) (noting denunciation by world community of capital sentencing
for juvenile offenders).
194. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200 (concluding that extrinsic evidence does not
preclude conclusion that consensus against executing juvenile offenders indicates
that such punishment has become cruel and unusual within meaning of Eighth
Amendment); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (finding no reason to disagree with decisions
of legislatures in prohibiting execution of mentally retarded offenders).
195. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1148-49 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (noting importance and severity of process of
deciding upon whom death should be imposed and discussing Court's numerous
failures at appropriately regulating such processes by failing to consider all factors
surrounding death penalty debate). But see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 352-53 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (protesting that Atkins decision wrongfully expands list of factors con-
sidered in determining constitutionality of capital sentences); Silversten, supra
note 20, at 152-53 (opining that Framers of Constitution did not want Court to
consider any factors other than Constitution's text in declaring validity of statutes).
196. Accord Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1196 (quoting Atkins's enumeration of two
distinct social purposes served by punishment); see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (Stewart, Powell and Stevens, J]., joint
opinion)) (finding retribution and deterrence to be social purposes behind capital
punishment).
197. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 ("With respect to retribution-the interest in
seeing that the offender gets his 'just deserts'-the severity of the appropriate pun-
ishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender.").
198. See Fleming, supra note 20, at 737 ("Raping a child, if unaccompanied by
any other crime, does not result in death. It is a heinous and serious crime deserv-
ing of severe punishment; however, because it does not result in loss of life, it does
not deserve the death penalty."). The punishment of death does not have any
retributive effect. See, e.g., Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1164 (finding retributive
goals of child rape statutes will not be met); Fleming, supra note 20, at 749 (opin-
ing lack of proportionality of sentence in executing child rapists renders statutes
ineffective at achieving retributive goals); Lormand, supra note 20, at 1012 (dis-
cussing potential negative effects of capital rape statutes, such as decreased report-
ing of intra-family child rapes and negative effects on goals of retribution);
Moeller, supra note 20, at 642 (arguing that because retribution is directly tied to
offender's individual culpability, execution of offenders who do not kill is dispro-
portionate and fails to contribute to retributive aims of punishment); Schaaf, supra
note 20, at 356-57 (noting that strict liability statutes, which permit offenders to be
sentenced to death without possessing intent to commit crime, defeat any deter-
rent or retributive effects statute may have). But see, e.g., Gray, supra note 20, at
1468 (finding goals of retribution satisfied by execution of child rapists); Meister,
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proportionate to the crime for which they are imposed. 19 9 An overly
harsh punishment would not fit a less severe crime. 200 While the rape of a
child is certainly no minor crime, it does not rise to the level of severity
mandated to warrant the taking of the offender's life.
20 1
A punishment possesses a deterrent effect if it discourages others
from committing the criminal acts being punished.20 2 Additionally, it is
well established that any punishment that is more severe than another, yet
fails to provide a greater deterrent effect, is considered disproportionate
and therefore unconstitutional. 20 3 There is no evidence to suggest that
instances of aggravated rape have decreased in Louisiana since the passage
of the capital rape law in 1995, as would have been expected had the law
enjoyed a deterrent effect.20 4 Accordingly, because insufficient support
supra note 20, at 224 (concluding that executing child rapists is not offensive to
Eighth Amendment and therefore sufficient to meet goals of punishment).
199. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 168 (1987) (requiring that punish-
ment must be proportionate to crime punished); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
788 (1982) (finding death disproportionate for non-triggerman in capital murder
who did not kill, attempt to kill or intend to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (finding death disproportionate for rape of adult woman); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976) (requiring punishment be proportionate to
crime and finding death proportionate sentence for first-degree murder).
200. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (rejecting denationaliza-
tion of army soldier convicted of wartime desertion); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (rejecting fifteen years hard labor as disproportionate sen-
tence for falsifying documents).
201. Accord Bailey, supra note 20, at 1372 (opining that capital sentence is
disproportionate and unconstitutional for rape even when victim is child); see State
v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1074 (La. 1996) (Calogero, C.J., dissenting) (finding
death penalty unconstitutional for crime of rape of child under age twelve), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997).
202. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (defining deterrence as "the interest in
preventing capital crimes by prospective offenders").
203. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 & n.141 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("[P]unishment may not be more severe than is necessary to serve the
legitimate interests of the State.").
204. See FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2004 89
(2004) (reporting 35.8 forcible rapes per 100,000 residents in Louisiana in 2004);
FBI, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2003 85 (2003) (reporting
41.1 forcible rapes per 100,000 residents in Louisiana in 2003); FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2002 81 (2002) (reporting 34.1 forcible rapes
per 100,000 residents in Louisiana in 2002); FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 2001 79 (2001) (reporting 31.4 forcible rapes per 100,000 re-
sidents in Louisiana in 2001); FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2000 78 (2000) (reporting 33.5 forcible rapes per 100,000 residents in Lou-
isiana in 2000); FBI, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1999 77
(1999) (reporting 33.1 forcible rapes per 100,000 residents in Louisiana in 1999);
FBI, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1998 76 (1998) (reporting
36.8 forcible rapes per 100,000 residents in Louisiana in 1998); FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1997 79 (1997) (reporting 41.3 forcible rapes
per 100,000 residents in Louisiana in 1997); FBI, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 1996 75 (1996) (reporting 41.5 forcible rapes per 100,000 re-
sidents in Louisiana in 1996); FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1995 71 (1995) (reporting 42.7 forcible rapes per 100,000 residents in Lou-
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exists for the contention that execution is a greater deterrent than impris-
onment for rape, the penalty is cruel and unusual within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment. 2
0 5
While child rapists may possess no absolute characteristic that serves
to reduce their culpability, the inherent nature of their crimes mitigates
against the imposition of capital punishment.20 6 Rapists, by definition, do
not take the lives of their victims. 20 7 If they did, they would be murderers,
and the constitutionality of a sentence of death would not be in question
under the Court's currentjurisprudence. 20 8 Although rapists commit acts
that are considered savage and horrifying, they do not murder within the
meaning of the law.20 9 By subjecting child rapists to the possibility of a
death sentence upon conviction, they have no reason to allow the rape
victim to live. 2 10 By murdering their victims, rapists eliminate the best po-
tential witness against their case and face no greater punishment at trial
isiana in 1995). Although the Uniform Crime Reports, from which this data is
amassed, do not specifically identify victim information for those twelve years and
younger, it is estimated that approximately one in six forcible rape victims are
twelve years old or younger. PATRICK A. LANGAN & CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, OF-
FICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIME DATA BRIEF: CHILD RAPE VICTIMS, 1992 1-2 (1994) (providing methodology
for calculating percentage of rape victims who are children).
205. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Although the
determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be grounded in a judg-
ment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the more significant basis is that the
punishment serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punish-
ment.") (footnote omitted).
206. See Owen W. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation
and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REv. 827, 829-31 (1999) (portraying differences in re-
searchers' beliefs about why rapes occur). Because leading scientists are unable to
determine what general motivation is responsible for sexual offenders' criminal
behavior, they have been unable to conclude that there is one specific characteris-
tic or trait that compels rapists to rape. See generally id. (discussing research into
traits that may be common among sex offenders); Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott
Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape
Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 153-61 (2001) (describing genre of rapists known
as "crazed" rapists).
207. See Volokh, supra note 11, at 1968 (describing difficult nature of line-
drawing in criminal culpability but identifying clear line between crimes in which
life was taken and all other crimes).
208. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (finding death penalty
proportionate to crime of deliberate murder).
209. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) ("[R]ape by definition
does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The
murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not."). But see Meister, supra
note 20, at 224 ("One who takes another's life is a murderer; one who rapes a child
under the age of twelve murders innocence.").
210. See Glazer, supra note 20, at 85 ("Opponents [of the statute] argue ...
that a rapist, knowing he is subject to the death penalty both for merely raping the
victim, or for raping and subsequently killing the victim, will have no incentive to
not kill [sic] the victim.").
[Vol. 51: p. 417454
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss2/5
than if they had allowed the victims to survive. 2 11 Thus, by condoning
capital sentencing for child rapists, Louisiana runs the risk of encounter-
ing more child rape/murder victims.
212
Additionally, an international analysis would show that the world com-
munity has rejected execution as a punishment for rape even when the
victim is a child.2' 3 Beginning with Trop v. Dulles, the Court has consist-
ently looked to international sources for purposes of consensus-building,
even when determining matters strictly pertaining to American constitu-
tional interpretation.2 14 When the Supreme Court decided Coker, it cited
a 1965 survey stating that only three of sixty major countries sanctioned
the death penalty for the crime of rape.21 5 In the forty years since that
211. See Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1159 ("When death is the penalty for rape
and murder, .. . the rapist has every incentive to kill the child victim because the
child is likely to be the only witness .... If murder does not incur additional
punishment, then the motivation to kill the primary witness to the crime is
strong.") (footnotes omitted); Lormand, supra note 20, at 1013 (finding that rap-
ists may have increased motivation to kill their victims to dramatically reduce likeli-
hood of being identified and punished).
212. See Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1159 (noting rapists have increased incen-
tive to murder victim if no supplementary punishment will be inflicted). One com-
mentator noted the impossibility of making an accurate prediction as to how many
murders of child rape victims could occur if death remains an available punish-
ment for child rape. See Glazer, supra note 20, at 106 (explaining indeterminable
nature of statistics of crimes which do not occur).
213. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 1-3 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1993) (discussing steady
decline of international acceptance of capital punishment); Rayburn, supra note
13, at 1140-43 (noting international trend away from capital sentencing and noting
that several countries that elect to execute rapists do so under religious laws, not
civil statutes).
214. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005) ("[T]he United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002)
("[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.");
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988) (examining permissi-
bility of executingjuveniles in foreign countries); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
796-97 n.22 (observing that "the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in
England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Common-
wealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe"); Coker, 433 U.S. at 596
n.10 (finding value in examining international acceptance of capital punishment);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) ("The civilized nations of the world are in
virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for
crime."). But see Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he basic pre-
mise.., that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world...
ought to be rejected out of hand."); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting) ("[I]f it is evidence of a national consensus for which we are looking, then
the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.").
215. Accord ScHABAs, supra note 213, at 196-200 (observing that opposition to
capital punishment by international community, even for rape and murder, was
widely apparent as early as 1949 Geneva Conventions); see Coker, 433 U.S. at 596
n.10 (noting that only three of sixty nations surveyed retained capital punishment
for rape in which victim's life was not taken).
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survey was compiled, dozens of additional countries have abolished capital
punishment for all crimes, and countless others have substantially nar-
rowed the class of death-eligible defendants. 2 16 At the present time, there
is no evidence that the death penalty enjoys any greater international ac-
ceptance for the crime of rape, whether of an adult woman or a child,
than it did at the time Coker was decided. 2 17 Therefore, the Atkins-Roper
analysis would fail to identify the existence of any international influence
that could lead to a conclusion contrary to the national consensus against
capital punishment for child rapists. 2 18
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the Cokerdecision in 1977, the Supreme Court's capital jurispru-
dence has grown dramatically and unpredictably.2 19 One factor that has
remained constant, however, is the states' near-unanimity in their legisla-
tive opposition to capital sentencing for rape. 22 0 Pursuant to the method
of analysis for the constitutionality of capital sentences the Court adopted
in Atkins and Roper, the Louisiana capital rape statute fails to survive Su-
preme Court scrutiny.2 21
Until 2003, the debate over the statute's legitimacy was merely aca-
demic in nature; despite the Louisiana Supreme Court's affirmative deci-
216. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 193, at 1120 (counting 111 countries that
have abolished capital punishment, while eighty-four countries retain it). The
United States lags behind the rest of the world community in identifying evolving
standards of decency, which would necessitate the abolition of the death penalty,
particularly for specific crimes and against certain offenders to whom few, if any,
other democracies in the world continue to apply capital sentencing. See generally
id. (noting sluggish nature of United States to adhere to larger, globally accepted
beliefs on continued use of death penalty).
217. See ScHABAs, supra note 213, at 2 (indicating steady trend in world com-
munity away from capital punishment since 1945). But see Rayburn, supra note 13,
at 1140-43 (finding international opinion mixed about executing child rapists). It
is difficult to identify which nations execute offenders for child rape because statis-
tics such as ages of rape victims are not always kept accurately. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CROSS NATIONAL STUDIES IN CRIME AND
JUSTICE vii (2004) (describing difficulties in compiling accurate rape statistics in
international community because different victim information is gathered in dif-
ferent countries).
218. See generally SCHABAs, supra note 213 (outlining history of death penalty
and describing consistent trend in international community away from capital
sentencing).
219. See Suleiman, supra note 6, at 427 (describing development and variable
nature of Court's capital jurisprudence).
220. See Rayburn, supra note 13, at 1137-39 (noting that despite several states'
discussions of passing statutes similar to Louisiana's, no jurisdiction has yet done
so).
221. For a discussion of Atkins-Roper analysis and its application to capital rape
statutes, see supra notes 159-218 and accompanying text.
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sion in Wilson, no defendants had been sentenced under the law.222 That
changed in August 2003 when a Jefferson Parish jury sentenced Patrick
Kennedy to death for raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter.22 3 Ken-
nedy's conviction has breathed new life into the death debate, spurring
speculation as to how the Supreme Court may rule should it decide his
appeal. 2 24 A Supreme Court analysis of Kennedy's sentence would likely
follow the guidelines set forward by the Court in Atkins and Roper, the two
most recent substantive cases on the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment.2 25 Under the methods of analysis and review utilized in those cases,
Louisiana's statute fails to pass muster and must be declared unconstitu-
tional in violation of the Eighth Amendment.22 6
James H. S. Levine
222. See Joe Darby, Man Gets Death in Rape of Girl, 8; Judge Rejects Request to
Grant New Trial, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 3, 2003, at MI, available at
2003 WLNR 2095533 (noting first sentencing under R.S. 14:42 in August 2003).
223. See id. (recounting details of Kennedy's crimes); Liptak, supra note 187
(discussing unusual nature of capital sentence for rape); see also State v. Kennedy,
854 So. 2d 296, 296 (La. 2003) (affirming death sentence for convicted child
rapist).
224. See Kris Axtman, Judicial Rarity: Death Penalty in a Rape Case, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 8, 2003, at 2, available at 2003 WLNR 2243468 (speculating
whether death sentence will be upheld if Kennedy's appeal reaches United States
Supreme Court).
225. SeeJennifer Eswari Borra, Roper v. Simmons, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 707, 715 (2005) (implying that because Roper will likely have conse-
quences on future death penalty cases, methods of analysis implemented therein
will also be similarly utilized).
226. For a discussion of Atkins-Roper analysis and its application to capital rape
statutes cases, see supra notes 159-218 and accompanying text.
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